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Post-Crisis Economic Reform in Indonesia: 
Policy for Intervening in Ownership 
in Historical Perspective1 
Yuri Sato 
 
Introduction 
 
Economic reform in Indonesia after the Asian currency crisis is often discussed in 
parallel with Thailand and South Korea, which were alike hit by the crisis. It should 
however be noted that what happened in Indonesia was a change of political regime 
from authoritarianism to democracy, not just a change of government as seen in 
Thailand and South Korea. Indonesia’s post-crisis reform should be understood in the 
context of dismantling of the Soeharto regime to seek a new democratic state system. 
 In the political sphere, dramatic institutional changes have occurred since the 
downfall of the Soeharto government in May 1998. In comparison, changes in the 
economic sphere are more complex than the political changes, as the former involve at 
least three aspects. The first is the continuity in the basic framework of capitalist 
system with policy orientation toward economic liberalization. In this framework, the 
policies to overcome the crisis are continued from the last period of the Soeharto rule, 
under the support system of IMF and CGI (Consultative Group on Indonesia). The 
second aspect is the impact of the political regime change on the economic structure. It 
is considered that the structure of economic vested interests of the Soeharto regime is 
being disintegrated as the regime breaks down. The third aspect is the impact of the 
political regime change on economic policy-making process. The process of 
formulating and implementing policies has changed drastically from the Soeharto time. 
With these three aspects simultaneously at work, it is not so easy to identify which of 
them is the main cause for a given specific economic phenomenon emerging in 
Indonesia today. 
                             
1 This paper was originally written in Japanese, in March 2002. 
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 Keeping this difficulty in mind, this paper attempts to situate the post-crisis 
economic reform in the broader context of the historical development of Indonesian 
economic policies and their achievements. We focus in particular on the reform 
policies for banking and corporate sectors and resulting structural changes in these 
sectors. This paper aims at understanding the significance of the changes in the 
economic ownership structure that are occurring in the post-Soeharto Indonesia.  
 Economic policies here do not mean macro economic policies, such as fiscal, 
financial and trade policies, but refer to micro economic policies whereby the 
government intervenes in the economic ownership structure. In Section 1, we clarify 
why economic policies for intervening in the ownership structure are important in 
understanding Indonesia. Section 2 follows the historical development of Indonesia’s 
economic policies as specified above, throughout the four successive periods since 
Indonesia’s independence, namely, the parliamentary democracy period, the Guided 
Democracy period under Soekarno, the Soeharto-regime consolidation period, and the 
Soeharto-regime transfiguration period2. Then we observe what economic ownership 
structure was at work in the pre-crisis last days of the Soeharto rule as an outcome of 
the economic policies. In Section 3, we examine what structural changes have taken 
place in the banking and corporate sectors due to the reform policies in the post-crisis 
and post-Soeharto Indonesia. Lastly in Section 4, we interpret the current 
reorganization of the economic ownership in the context of the historical transition of 
the ownership structure, taking account of the changes in the policy-making processes 
under democratization. 
 
1. Indonesia’s Economic Policies  
–– Why are Policies Intervening in Ownership Important? 
 
Initial given conditions a country had at the start of its modern nation building are 
considered to largely determine which economic policy area its government put the 
                             
2 For this periodical demarcation, see Sato [2003]. 
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first priority. It is well known that Japan has given a heavy weight to industrial policies. 
Industrial policies here mean policies for intervening in inter-industrial and intra-
industrial resource allocation3. Since Japan had but poor energy and natural resources 
as input materials, the government had to attach great importance to selecting priority 
industries and to preferentially allocating the limited resources among and within the 
priority industries for effective improvement in economic welfare.  
 Indonesia on its part had different initial conditions. Though it obtained the 
status of a sovereign state in the end of 1949, economically it failed to have Dutch 
assets devolved, so that it had to embark on the path of national development with its 
colonial economy intact. Under these circumstances, the country’s priority task was to 
construct an Indonesian national economy worthy of an independent state. In fact, the 
Indonesian government had a strong desire to foster domestic capital that would work 
as a counter-force to colonial capital. Indonesia had ample energy and natural resources 
as well as labor force, but capital and technology needed to combine the resources with 
productive activities were in the hands of foreigners. To accumulate domestic capital 
with scarce capital and technological capacity, entrepreneurship held the key. Here 
emerged the need for a policy choice over which potential entrepreneurs the 
government should emphatically promote as the driving force of economic 
development. The chief concern was thus what kinds of domestic capital were to be 
promoted to break the foreign domination. The question, which industries, was a 
secondary concern in the sense that it was a matter of means to achieve the aim. 
 As to which kinds of domestic capital to foster, there were two sets of 
alternatives. One set of alternatives was about whether state capital or private capital 
and the other was about whether pribumi (indigenous Malay) capital or ethnic Chinese 
capital. Big capital or small capital was another set, which logically had nothing to do 
                             
3 Ito, Kiyono, Okuno, Suzumura [1988: 3-4] defines industrial policies as “policies intended to 
influence the country’s economic welfare by intervening in the resource allocation among the 
industries (sectors) of the country or in the industrial organization within a specific industry 
(sector).” 
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with ownership, but in reality it involved ownership in the schematic sense that big 
capital meant foreign, state, and ethnic Chinese capital and small capital practically 
pribumi capital. 
 Economic policies can be simply defined as government interventions in 
economic processes. If the government chooses priority capital among the above 
alternatives of ownership with a certain political will, it is the economic policy for 
intervening in the ownership structure we are discussing. Policies in this category 
include, among others, nationalization, private capital utilization, foreign capital 
restriction or utilization, ethnic Chinese capital restriction or mobilization, pribumi 
capital promotion, and small capital promotion. These policies have been playing a 
major role in Indonesia’s development strategies since independence. In the following, 
we are outlining the historical evolution and achievements of these policies. 
 
2.Historical Evolution of the Economic Policies for Intervening in the 
Ownership Structure 
 
1. Indonesianisasi by Pribumi Capital –– Parliamentary Democracy Period 
 
Let us begin with the initial conditions of the Indonesian economy. In November 1949, 
the Hague Round Table Conference convened with the United Nations mediation 
agreed to transfer sovereignty over the Indonesian territory from the Netherlands to 
Indonesia. With this, Indonesia through four years of struggle after its proclamation of 
independence became a sovereign state. In this conference, the Financial-Economic 
Agreement (Finec: Financieel-Economische Overeenkomst) was signed simultaneously 
with the Charter of the Transfer of Sovereignty. The Finec provided for the 
preservation of Dutch assets, guaranteed the rights of foreign economic activities in the 
Indonesian territory, and made it mandatory for the Indonesian government to 
compensate in case foreign assets were nationalized (JIIA [1972: 191-201]). The door 
was thus practically closed to Indonesia’s takeover or devolution of colonialist assets. 
Indonesia had to begin with the bequeathed colonial economy. Euro-American 
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companies, centering on the “Big Five” Dutch trading companies, placed under their 
control the key economic sectors ranging from foreign trade, shipping, banking, 
insurance to plantation, mining, and manufacturing. Chinese businessmen were playing 
the major role in domestic trade and small and medium-scale manufacturing (Most of 
them did not have Indonesian nationality). Indonesia became a sovereign state, but 
lacked even a central bank as the symbol of economic sovereignty. Breaking this 
complete foreign control through Indonesianisasi (Indonesianization) of economy was 
one of the major state objectives pursued throughout the Soekarno era4. 
 How can the economy be Indonesianized? During the parliamentary 
democracy period of the 1950s, the government opted for policies to strengthen private 
capital rather than state capital. This preference for private capital was because the 
political elite, who shared the Western democratic political values of the 1950 
Provisional Constitution, favored party politics and representative democracy on the 
political sphere and liberal economy based on private capital on the economic sphere as 
a set. State-centered governance was consciously shunned both in politics and 
economy. Minister of Trade and Industry Sumitro Djojohadikusomo (in Muhammad 
Natsir Cabinet of Masyumi Party, 1950-51) presented in 1951 the Emergency 
Economic Plan (Rentjana Urgensi Perekonomian), followed by an Interim Report of 
the Committee on Industrialization (Laporan Interim Panitia Industrialisasi). In both 
documents, state capital was regarded as the temporary complement to private capital, 
                             
4 Within the government, however, there was a debate between two groups, those emphasizing 
economic stabilization with accepting Dutch presence and those emphasizing Indonesianization. 
The representative of the first group was Sjafruddin Prawiranegara (Minister of Finance [1950-51], 
the first Governor of the Bank Indonesia [1951-58], Masyumi Party). He developed debate with 
Sumitro Djojohadikusumo (Minister of Trade and Industry [1951], Minister of Finance [1952-53, 
1955-56], Indonesian Socialist Party) who took the second position. The position of 
Indonesianization was bequeathed to the post-1953 more nationalistic cabinets of the Indonesian 
Nationalist Party. This development is detailed by Glassburner [1971: 71-82]. See also Thee ed. 
[2003:10]. 
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stating that investment by state capital should be limited to defense, public works and 
some other sectors having broad influences on the economy (Djojohadikusumo [1954: 
31-32]). 
 The private capital component of domestic capital meant pribumi capital. The 
Benteng Program implemented in 1951-56 was the chief policy for Indonesianization5. 
Benteng means fortress. The idea was that the government built a fortress for protecting 
pribumi enterprises as a counter-force to foreign enterprises that dominated economy. 
In concrete, the government under this program designated a set of consumer goods as 
“benteng import goods” and the Ministry of Finance issued import licenses for pribumi 
businessmen to whom foreign exchange was preferentially allocated. Also, Bank 
Negara Indonesia (BNI)6, the first state bank set up in 1946, extended loans to the 
benteng importers, with a view to bringing them up as a viable business force. This was 
a strategy to use pribumi capital as a leverage to break a part of the Dutch oligopoly in 
imports and to replace a part of Chinese merchants with pribumi importers. The import 
sector was selected for this strategy as this sector was considered easier to penetrate 
with no accumulation of capital and technology compared with the manufacturing 
sector. Under the benteng program, the number of pribumi importers jumped from 145 
at the start to 800 in 1953 and further to 3,500 at the end of 1954. But it turned out that 
most of them were mere brokers who resold import licenses to Chinese importers. In 
order to foreclose this broker phenomenon, Minister of Finance Sumitro (in Wilopo 
Cabinet of Indonesian National Party, 1952-53) limited issue of import licenses to 
                             
5 For the Benteng Program, see Glassburner [1971], Thomas and Panglaykim [1973], Thee ed. 
[2003], Sato [1985]; for more comprehensive history of economic policy in this period, see Sutter 
[1959]. 
6 Bank Negara Indonesia (BNI) was originally established to be Indonesia’s central bank. But as a 
Dutch bank, De Javasche Bank, was nationalized in 1951 with purchasing shares and became 
Indonesia’s central bank, BNI became specialized in foreign exchange business and importer 
financing. Together with Bank Industri Negara (BIN) set up in 1951 for financing and investment in 
the manufacturing sector, BNI functioned as the core of government financing. 
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those who satisfied certain fixed asset requirements. Conversely, Minister of Finance 
Rooseno Surjohadikusumo (in first Sastroamidjojo Cabinet of Indonesian National 
Party, 1954-55) relaxed the conditions of license issue to Chinese registered as 
Indonesian nationals. The Benteng Program helped the growth of a handful of pribumi 
entrepreneurs7, but the overwhelming majority of its beneficiaries ended up as bubble 
traders. The program was terminated in 1957, failing to achieve its expected objectives. 
 Separate from the Benteng Program, the government also set out to protect 
pribumi capital in the batik and kretek (clove) cigarette industries, both of which were 
traditional industries but were being taken over by Chinese capital. For this purpose, 
the government had two producers’ associations organized, namely, the Indonesian 
Federation of Batik Cooperatives (Gabungan Koperasi Batik Indonesia: GKBI) and the 
Indonesian Clove Purchasing Center (Pusat Pembelian Tjengkeh Indonesia: PPTI). 
The associations were given the monopoly rights of import and distribution over raw 
materials, cotton cloth and clove, respectively. This case shows that protection for 
specific capitalists and specific producers by means of licensing was already started in 
the 1950s as a basic tool of government economic intervention. 
 There were two main reasons for the failure of the pribumi capital fostering 
policy in the parliamentary democracy period. The first was an economic reason that 
the import sector failed to constantly grow and so failed to serve as the booster of 
capital accumulation. As the Korean War Boom receded in 1952, Indonesia’s exports 
decelerated and the government had to restrict imports. But the import restriction 
kicked off inflation. To restrain inflation, the government eased import restrictions, but 
that critically undermined balance of payments, forcing the government to go back to 
import restriction. Indonesia was caught in this vicious cycle. The foreign exchange 
                             
7 Typical examples were Sumatra merchants Dasaad and Rahman Tamin, who had started import 
business in the 1930s and entered small plantations and manufacturing during the Benteng Program 
period; and Masagoes Noer Moechammad Hasjim Ning and Soedarpo Sastrosatomo, originally 
Benteng importers who later successfully expanded their business into broader sectors (Robison 
[1986: 51-57], Sato [1985: 88-89]). 
IDE Research Paper No. 4, September 2003 
reserves to allocate for the Benteng Program chronically fell short. The government 
had to raise tariff rates to offset state budget deficits, which also pressured imports 
(Thomas and Panglaykim [1973:49], Mihira [1995: 195-6]). The second was a political 
reason. As party cabinets were all short lived and took precedence over party interests, 
their policies could not be effective. In fact, eight cabinets came and went in the eight 
years of parliamentary democracy. The PNI (Indonesian National Party) cabinets, 
favoring expansionist policies, generously issued import licenses for pribumi importers. 
Before the 1955 general elections, license fees informally collected from the licensees 
were used as PNI’s election campaign fund 8 . In contrast, the cabinets of Islamic 
Masyumi Party followed tightening policies, making licensing conditions stricter. Thus 
the pribumi capital fostering policy in this period was marred by inconsistency  
 
2. Indonesianisasi by State Capital –– Guided Democracy Period 
 
Pointing to the failure of the Benteng Program, voices became louder in the 
government calling for direct state intervention into the economy. At this juncture, in 
December 1957 Indonesia launched struggle against Holland for the recovery of West 
Irian, which had been a contested issue since the Hague Conference. This triggered a 
drive for the take-over of Dutch assets. As the struggle provoked strong anti-Dutch 
sentiments, employees and labor union members began to occupy Dutch enterprises on 
their initiative. The government ipso facto approved the confiscation and in 1958 
officially nationalized all the Dutch assets. Nationalized were 489 enterprises in total, 
comprising 216 plantations, 161 mining and manufacturing, 40 trading and 16 
insurance companies. Many of Euro-American companies other than Dutch were also 
nationalized by step by the middle of the 1960s. Eight major Indonesian trading 
companies, created by the seizure of 10 Dutch companies, monopolized the import of 
                             
8  On charge of this malpractice, then Minister of Finance, Iskak, was sentenced to five months in 
prison in 1960 (Pos Indonesia 6 July 1960, Keng Po 16 Feb. 1960, Thomas and Panglaykim [1973: 
49]). 
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consumer goods, which represented 70% of the country’s total import. The state 
objective of Indonesianisasi of the key sectors was thus achieved, and state-owned 
enterprises consequently emerged as the core of the Indonesian economy9. This was 
materialization of “Guided Economy” (Ekonomi Terpimpin) based on Soekarno-
advocated Indonesian Socialism (Sosialisme à la Indonesia)10. 
 Using the state enterprises of foreign origin as the core, the government set out 
to establish new state enterprises. These included the first domestic plants of urea 
fertilizer and glass bottles that had been planned since the 1950s, and additional 
manufacturers in paper, spinning and shipbuilding. As of 1960, the total number of 
state enterprises reached 986. The headache, however, was the shortages of capable 
personnel to run these companies. Not only bureaucrats but also party politicians and 
military men were assigned to work. After nationalization, performance of most state 
enterprises apparently got stagnant or declined. Suffering from deteriorating balance 
sheets, state enterprises proved to be a heavy drag on the state coffers, not a source of 
revenue as expected. The government invested out of the scarce state funds in new 
state enterprises, but many of them failed to start operation as planned.  
 During this period, the sector of domestic small pribumi capital was placed 
                             
9 For the nationalization process and state enterprises during this period, see Thomas and 
Panglaykim [1973: Chapter 3], Castles [1965], Nagai [1963], Matsuo [1963]; for state enterprises 
up to the Soeharto period, see Pangestu and Habir [1989], Mihira and Sato ed. [1992: 103-123, 384-
407]. 
10 Indonesian Socialism represents a broad state vision encompassing national identity, politics, 
economy, society and a new Indonesian personality. It is supposed to come true after the Indonesian 
revolution has been accomplished. As for this, refer to Soekarno’s speech in 1963, “Socialism does 
not descend from heaven” (JIIA ed. [1973: 218-225]). As for economic aspects of Indonesian 
Socialism, Soekarno gave his account in his Economic Declaration (Deklarasi Ekonomi, or 
“Dekon”) in 1963 (Departemen Penerangan [1965], JIIA ed. [1973: 205-216]). Kishi and Masuda 
ed. [1963] provides explanation on the relationship between Indonesian Socialism and Guided 
Democracy. 
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under the state control as a lower branch of the state enterprises. Imported goods and 
finished and semi-finished products made by state enterprises were supplied to private 
firms through cooperatives and business associations, while products of private firms 
and farmers were marketed through the cooperatives11. Private importers had to sell 
goods through state trading enterprises. The government not only controlled the 
distribution channels but also appointed officials of state enterprises as managers of 
cooperatives to place them under state supervision. 
 In the Benteng program period, Chinese capital was regarded as a target of 
Indonesianization to be replaced by pribumi capital. But in the process of state capital 
taking over Dutch management, Chinese businessmen who had managerial know-how 
unofficially began to play the role of assistant to state capital. For instance, military 
men appointed state or local government enterprise managers, sometimes contracted 
management out to Chinese businessmen. The advance of the military into the political 
arena as a force substituting for political parties coincided with the advance of Chinese 
into the business arena. On the other hand, the policy of regulating Chinese activities 
was continued. Particularly Government Regulation No.10 1959 dealt a heavy blow to 
Chinese rural retailers. This regulation prohibited Chinese not registered as Indonesian 
nationals from retail trading at the sub-district and village level12. But Chinese retailers 
managed to survive by working through Indonesia-born second generation or using the 
name of native Indonesians. 
 To sum up, the Indonesian dream of wiping out foreign economic domination 
was accomplished in the Guided Democracy period and numerous state enterprises 
became a chief actor in the key economic sectors. But macro economic conditions and 
                             
11 See Miyayama [1963] for cooperatives in the Soekarno era. 
12 According to a report by the Director General of Domestic Trade in the Ministry of Trade, this 
regulation was applied to 30,915 of the approximately 90,000 foreign retailers, but those whose 
business was actually closed down rested at 12,479. After the regulation was enforced, 210,000 
Chinese residents wished to go back to China, but only 80,000 could leave the country partly 
because of shortage of ships (Umezawa [1992: 65]). 
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management capabilities to allow the state enterprises to grow smoothly were absent. 
Consequently their operations stayed stagnant. Small pribumi capital in the private 
sector was drawn into the government’s control system. Chinese capital, though 
subjected to regulatory measures, gradually expanded its influence. 
 
3. Mobilization of Chinese Capital –– Soeharto-Regime Consolidation Period  
 
(1) Basic policies for foreign capital, ethnic Chinese capital, and state capital 
 Army Lt. Gen. Soeharto, grabbing power on March 11 1966, drastically 
shifted Indonesia’s economic system from “Indonesian Socialism” to capitalism. 
Setting economic development, or pembangunan, as the state’s priority objective, he 
virtually completed the basic strategies and institutions needed to achieve the objective 
by 1968. From the point of view of government intervention in economic ownership 
structure, following three sets of policy should be discussed. 
 The first was a dramatic changeover in foreign capital policy. One essential 
ingredient of the shift to capitalist system was opening the economy to foreign capital. 
The Soeharto government returned to their original owners the nationalized Euro-
American companies except the Dutch. Then it promulgated a foreign investment law, 
the Law No.1 1967, as the first economic law under the new regime. This law opened 
the door to foreign capital in all areas excepting ports, electric power, shipping, airline 
service, railways, communication, mass media, and defense industry. Inflow of foreign 
capital began in 1967. The closed economy under Soekarno now turned to an open 
economy. 
 The second was a new policy toward Chinese capital. This was an epoch-
making change intended to mobilize ethnic Chinese capital for economic development. 
Chinese capital that had been treated as foreign capital was now categorized as 
domestic capital irrespective of whether the Chinese had Indonesian nationality or not. 
As the Chairman of the Cabinet Presidium, Soeharto proclaimed the Basic Policy for 
the Solution of the Chinese Problem (Cabinet Presidium Instruction No. 37 dated June 
7 1967). With this instruction, the government provided protection and guarantee of 
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status for 3.5 million Chinese residents, most of whom were still foreign nationals13. 
The policy explicitly stipulated their capital as “domestic capital” to be utilized for 
economic development (the exact term in the text was “foreign domestic capital” 
[modal domestik asing] meaning national assets in the hands of foreign residents) 
(BAKIN [1979: 64-65]). It is interesting to note that the interim report of the Policy 
Making Committee for the Solution of the Chinese Problem and its subcommittee’s 
provisional report stressed the need to dismantle Chinese economic power (Umezawa 
[1992: 58-60]). The Army leaders who occupied the Committee had deep-rooted anti-
Chinese sentiments, backed by their anti-Communism. However, Soeharto, who had 
tied up with Chinese merchants in his business since the days of the Diponegoro 
Division in the 1950s, believed it indispensable to effectively utilize entrepreneurial 
capabilities of the Chinese for a success of pembangunan. Then, it seems that, Soeharto 
induced the Army leaders to vent their anti-Chinese sentiments in the committee debate 
and canalized these sentiments into Chinese-regulating measures in the areas of 
education, language and social-cultural activities14. In the economic area, however, 
Soeharto decided to fully utilize Chinese capital, separated it from communism. This 
                             
13 This estimation of the Chinese population at about 3.5 million in 1967 is from the interim report 
of the Policy Making Committee for the Solution of the Chinese Problem. Umezawa [1992] 
contains a full text of the report in Japanese. 
14 The Basic Policy for the Solution of the Chinese Problem prohibited Chinese schools and 
restricted freedom of association for Chinese residents. Presidential Instruction No.14 1967 
restricted observance of Chinese religious practice and customs to families. Presidential Decree 
No.240 1967 on Chinese with Indonesian Nationality suppressed the use of Chinese names. 
Although no law was made to restrict political participation of Chinese (see BAKIN [1979]), unlike 
in the Soekarno period Chinese political participation was extremely limited during the Soeharto 
period. In fact, there was no ethnic Chinese minister except Mohamad Hasan (alias Bob Hasan), 
who served as Minister of Trade and Industry of the 7th Development Cabinet in the last two 
months of the Soeharto period. The Soeharto government strictly regulated Chinese activities in 
non-economic areas while guaranteeing them freedom of economic activities. 
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policy indeed was a sort of Soeharto’s institutional “innovation”, which later enabled 
ethnic Chinese business capitalists to rise and prosper. 
 The third was the switch from the state-enterprise expanding policy to their 
drastic consolidating policy. The Soeharto government inherited more than 900 state 
enterprises spawned during the Soekarno era. The decree titled Renovation of the Basic 
Policies on Economy, Finance and Development (Provisional MPR Decree No.23 
1966), which laid the basics of Soeharto government economic policy, emphasized 
deconcentration of state enterprises along with elimination of government control of 
economy (Mihira [1995: 203-204]). Liberalization of economy led by the private sector 
was in fact the key tenet of the Soeharto’s policy. The government simplified the status 
of most of state enterprises into profit-making joint-stock companies (PT(Persero)). 
The jurisdiction over these joint-stock state companies was shifted from various 
ministries to the Ministry of Finance. By 1974, the total number of state companies 
decreased to 178. 
 
(2) Changes in the basic policies after 1974 
 The three basic economic policies – liberalization of foreign capital, 
mobilization of Chinese capital, and consolidation of state enterprises – came to a 
turning point in 1974. That year was marked by two occurrences – an anti-Japan and 
anti-Chinese riot known as the Malari incident and the onset of an oil boom. Under 
their impact, the government switched its policy to foreign capital regulation, ethnic 
Chinese capital regulation, and expansion of the state enterprise sector. Of the three, 
the first and the third functioned, but the second not. Let us go further into this 
development. 
 As to the foreign capital policy, the policy of indiscriminate foreign capital 
introduction that the Foreign Investment Law of 1967 stipulated was before long 
replaced by selective introduction as the government adopted import substitution 
industrialization policy. In 1970, the government prohibited entry of foreign capital in 
general consumer-goods sectors where domestic production became able to satisfy 
domestic demand (Decree of the Minister of Trade No.314 1970). On the other hand, 
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the government encouraged foreign capital to come into selected promoting sectors by 
offering tax holiday incentive (Decree of the Minister of Finance No.94 1971). But it 
was the Malari incident on 15 January 1974, a riot attacking excess dependence on 
foreign capital, that caused the government policy totally turn to foreign capital 
regulation. After the incident, the government set up the Economic Stabilization 
Council, which announced the Investment Guideline. The main points of the Guideline 
were as follows: all foreign companies should be joint ventures with domestic capital; 
the existing 100% foreign-owned companies should list their stocks on the stock 
market; foreign companies should increase the Indonesian shareholding ratio to 51% 
within 10 years. The government also restricted employment of foreigners and levied 
surcharges on foreign employees staying beyond a certain period of time. These 
foreign capital regulations to localize ownership and employment were made into laws 
one after another15, and remained effective for 20 years until Indonesia went back again 
to the liberalization principle in 1994. 
 Regarding the second policy change, the official policy was shifted from 
mobilization to regulation of Chinese capital in favor of pribumi capital.  
 Let us briefly look back the Soeharto government’s Chinese capital 
mobilization methods. The aforesaid Basic Policy was the only official policy the 
Soeharto government announced regarding Chinese capital mobilization. In addition to 
policy tools, the government had an unofficial tool to intervene in the private sector, 
that was favor or disfavor in licensing. This was unofficial in the sense that there were 
no explicit criteria to qualify or disqualify license applicants. Licensing decisions were 
left to the discretion of the issuing authorities (but, licensing can be an official policy, 
if explicit criteria are set openly like the Benteng Program). The Soeharto government, 
in an effort to mobilize ethnic Chinese capital, used this unofficial tool of preferential 
                             
15 Mandatory localization of foreign shareholdings within 10 years was provided for by BKPM 
(Investment Coordination Board) Circular B1195 1974; restriction of employment of foreigners by 
Presidential Decree No.23 1974 as well as by ministerial decrees from 1974 through 1978 on an 
industry-by-industry basis (see Jakarta Japan Club [1985: 155-158]). 
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licensing. Generally, private companies had to obtain licenses of various kinds, such as 
an investment approval, import and export licenses, forest development concession etc. 
If only a few companies were licensed in a certain sector, the license winners would 
obtain monopolistic profits and accelerate their initial capital accumulation. Licensing 
authorities belonged to government ministries, but when it came to crucial projects or 
specific entrepreneurs, it seems that the President Soeharto himself intervened. Liem 
Sioe Liong, or Soedono Salim in Indonesian name, who had earned Soeharto’s trust as 
a supplier to the military in the 1950s, obtained several major licenses in 1968-71. In 
1968, PT Mega owned by Liem and another company owned by Probosutedjo, 
Soeharto’s younger stepbrother by a different mother, acquired a license on monopoly 
import of clove from the Ministry of Trade. In the following year, a flourmill, PT 
Bogasari, headed by Soeharto’s nephew Sudwikatmono and invested in by Liem won a 
monopolistic investment license and was granted loan directly from the Central Bank. 
In 1971, a company owned by Liem, together with other few companies including that 
owned by Bernard Ibnu Hardjojo, a younger brother of Soeharto’s wife, Siti Hartina 
Soeharto (alias Tien Soeharto), was given an investment license in the cement industry 
(Sato [1993]). These instances provide evidence that Soeharto himself participated in 
decision making, considering that Soeharto’s relatives were beneficiaries together with 
Liem and that Liem obtained licenses from more than one authority agency, a 
circumstance that bespeaks a certain voice from on high16. 
 As a natural consequence, this unofficial license allocation created co-
prosperity of high-ranking government officials as license issuers and ethnic Chinese 
businessmen as licensees. For instance, the said flour mill Bogasari stated in its articles 
of association that 26% of its profit shall be allocated to Dharma Putra Foundation 
                             
16 Soeharto’s relatives who obtained licenses together with Liem were all pribumi. As this case 
shows, it was not exclusively ethnic Chinese whom Soeharto preferentially treated in licensing but 
his pribumi kin were alike given licenses. While Probosutedjo succeeded in founding a medium-
sized Mercu Buana group, Bernard Ibnu Hardjojo failed to expand his business. This evidences that 
licensing privilege alone did not guarantee growth of business. 
IDE Research Paper No. 4, September 2003 
owned by the Army Strategic Reserve (Kostrad) from which Soeharto originally came, 
and to Harapan Kita Foundation headed by Mrs. Tien Soeharto17. As high government 
leaders frequently brokered establishment of foreign joint ventures, tripartite symbiosis 
developed among high-ranking officials (politicians, military officers and bureaucrats), 
ethnic Chinese businessmen and foreign investors. It is well known that Soedjono 
Hoemardani, Soeharto’s close aide and a military man serving as private presidential 
assistant (asisten pribadi: aspri), played an active middleman role in getting numerous 
joint ventures set up by Japanese companies and ethnic Chinese partners (Malley 
[1991]). 
 But after the Malari incident directed its attack to this tripartite alliance, the 
government promptly hammered out Chinese-regulating and pribumi favoring policies. 
The said Investment Guideline stipulated the following: (1) foreign companies can be 
set up only as joint ventures with pribumi as partners; (2) existing foreign companies 
having non-pribumi (ethnic Chinese)18 as partners should transfer 50% of their shares 
directly to pribumi or sell them on the stock market; and (3) companies owned by non-
pribumi should transfer 50% of their shares directly to pribumi or sell them on the 
stock market. The government also introduced two schemes of low-interest loan 
                             
17 The articles of association of PT Bogasari carried in the Official Gazette Supplement (Tambahan 
Berita Negara) No.258 1970 stipulated that 35% of the company’s profit should be used for 
executive remuneration, employee bonus and internal reserve and 60% of the remaining 65% 
should go to dividends, and 40% should go to the two foundations etc. The presence of such a 
clause in the articles of association points to Soeharto’s involvement in the establishment of this 
company. Incidentally Tambahan Berita Negara publishes the full texts of the articles of 
association of all joint-stock companies (PT: Perseroan Terbatas) at the founding time of the 
companies and everytime the articles are revised. 
18 Non-pribumi includes all non-Malay immigrant population such as Chinese, Arabs, and Indians. 
But Muslim Arabs have been largely integrated and Indians are negligibly small in number, less 
than 100,000, or 0.05% of the population. So in most cases non-pribumi refers to ethnic Chinese, 
and is often used pejoratively. 
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exclusively for pribumi business, namely, investment loan for small business (KIK) 
and working capital loan for small business (KMKP) at an interest rate of 12% and 
15% per annum respectively. As this series of policies was introduced during the first 
oil boom, it can be called the first pribumi preferential policy. During the second oil 
boom beginning in 1979, a Presidential Decree was issued to preferentially treat an 
“economically weak group” (golongan ekonomi lemah) 19  substantially meaning 
pribumi, in relation to bidding on government projects and government goods 
procurement. (Presidential Decree No.14 1979, No.10 1980, and No.14A 1980). These 
policies were called the second pribumi preferential policy. Government procurement 
in this period was handled by the state secretariat headed by Sudharmono. 
 In the period from the Malari incident through the two oil booms, pribumi 
capital promotion was thus brought forward, subjecting ethnic Chinese capital to 
regulatory measures. It is true that the second pribumi preferential policy helped some 
pribumi business groups to rise and grow20. But the overall effects of these policies 
stayed limited. The Guideline-given policy of “pribumization” of ethnic Chinese 
business was never made into law, while the foreign capital regulating measures in the 
Guideline were made into laws and enforced strictly. The regulations for pribumization 
were left to administrative guidance by the Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM), 
the government office in charge of investment licensing, and proved not to be enforced, 
                             
19 “Economically weak group” is defined as those companies which satisfy the following criteria 
simultaneously: (1) companies capitalized at Rp100 million or less in manufacturing and 
construction, and companies capitalized at Rp40 million or less in other industries, and (2) 
companies held by pribumi at 75% or more of their shares, or companies held by pribumi at 50% or 
more of their shares in the case that the majority of board members are pribumi. 
20 Bakrie Group, for instance, was revitalized thanks to the procurement by the government and by 
the state oil company Pertamina during the second oil boom. New pribumi business groups that 
began to grow using the momentum of this procurement policy include Bukaka Group led by Fadel 
Muhammad and M.Jusuf Kalla, and Kodel Group led by Fahmi Idris, Sugeng Sarjadi and their 
colleagues. 
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ending up as a mere slogan21. Ethnic Chinese businessmen, having accumulated power 
by 1974, may have conducted dealings with government officials and lobbied policy 
makers not to get the Guideline applied. Whatever the case, the Chinese-regulating 
policy in effect never hampered sustained growth of ethnic Chinese enterprises. 
 Thirdly, the basic consolidation policy for state enterprises evaporated with 
the arrival of the oil booms, giving place to an expanding policy. Jurisdiction over state 
enterprises, once unified under the Ministry of Finance, was again returned to various 
ministries in charge by their request (Presidential Decree No. 11 1973). Relying on 
burgeoning state oil revenue, state enterprises again began to proliferate until they 
came to count 222 enterprises in the peak year of 1983. They became the main 
promoter of state-led economic development and the core of economic nationalism that 
prospered in the oil booms. Also, the state enterprises emerged as the flag-bearer of the 
post-Malari pribumization of the economic ownership structure. 
 In this process, there emerged several ministers and presidents of state 
enterprises who, in line with President Soeharto’s intentions, directly led important 
projects beyond the heads of the ministries in charge. They included Ibnu Sutowo, B.J. 
Habibie, and A.R. Soehoed. Sutowo was President of Pertamina, the state oil company 
that went bankrupt in 1975. He took the initiative in construction of oil refineries, LNG 
plants, gas pipelines, fertilizer plants, and steel mills as well as development of Batam 
                             
21 Examining the Official Gazette Supplements, the author could not find cases of the local partner 
of any existing foreign companies switched from ethnic Chinese to pribumi or of the local partners 
of any newly established foreign companies became only to pribumi in the wake of the application 
of the Guideline. Conversely, the author found counter-evidence. For instance, the Argo Manunggal 
group, owned and managed by ethnic Chinese businessmen The Ning King, obtained a investment 
license even without using a nominal pribumi name two days after the announcement of the 
Guideline. The license was on the establishment of a Japanese joint venture with Kurashiki Boseki 
and Marubeni Corp. Two months later the group secured another license of joint venture with 
Ichimura Sangyo and Mitsui Corp., and a year and two months later with Ciba Geigy. (Official 
Gazette Supplement, No.440 1974, No.405 1975, and No.647 1975). 
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Island. Habibie, serving as State Minister of Research and Technology, took charge of 
“strategic industries” such as aircraft manufacture and shipbuilding, concurrently 
assuming presidency of state aircraft manufacturing company PT Industri Pesawat 
Terbang Nusantara (IPTN) and state shipbuilding company PT PAL. Soehoed, serving 
as Minister of Industry, planned a number of large state-led projects in heavy and 
chemical industries including bauxite refinery producing alumina and petrochemical in 
the second oil boom period. They were the ones who promoted domestic production of 
materials and capital goods by investing state funds, all this to acquire Indonesia’s 
“national resilience” in order to terminate its dependence on foreign countries. But the 
economic technocrats (backed by the World Bank and IMF) charged that the policy of 
state enterprise investment in capital-intensive industries was waste of development 
fund. They argued that, given abundant supply of labor and natural resources, 
Indonesia’s comparative advantage lay in labor-intensive and resource-based industries. 
But during the oil booms they did not have influence to change the state capitalist 
course of investment expansion. This was because the technocrats were able to 
participate only in budget planning and allocation on the responsibilities of the 
National Development Panning Agency (Bappenas) and the Ministry of Finance, while 
financial management of state enterprises was outside of their jurisdiction. Their 
starting capital aside, state enterprises were able to obtain investment funds from state 
banks and foreign sources, which were not bound by the state budget. Nor had the 
technocrats much say in the budget affairs either. They could not dare revise proposed 
expenditure plans in defiance of Soeharto’s political will, at a time when the state 
revenue was expanding. 
 Summing up, the Soeharto-regime consolidation period saw the initial 
economic liberalization policy quickly phased out with the onset of oil booms. In its 
place came the policy of restriction on foreign capital and expansion of state 
enterprises. Though, with this shift, restriction on ethnic Chinese capital and 
preferential treatment for pribumi capital were sloganeered, the pribumization of ethnic 
Chinese capital was not enforced. Ethnic Chinese capital in fact was given ample 
opportunities to grow throughout the period, and accelerated accumulation by dint of 
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alliance with political, military and bureaucratic elite. Reviewing this process, it can be 
argued that the most effective among the initial basic policy related to ownership 
structure was the mobilization policy of Chinese capital, rather than foreign capital 
liberalization policy, though the latter was generally perceived as a banner of 
Soeharto’s economic policy. With Soeharto’s policy shift, Chinese capital was for the 
first time explicitly accepted as an actor in economic development. Soeharto himself 
carried out this institutional “innovation” by placating inherently anti-Communist and 
anti-Chinese Army leaders. Compared with this emphasis on Chinese capital, foreign 
capital was consistently considered supplementary to domestic capital. 
 
4. Fostering Large Pribumi Capital –– Soeharto-Regime Transfiguration Period 
 
Institutionally completed in 1985, the Soeharto regime went into a period of 
transfiguration (Sato [2003]). One important aspect of the transfiguration was 
predilection for “pribumization” of the economy. Let us look at the factors behind this 
change and policy tools used for the purpose. 
 By pribumization of economy we mean full-scale efforts to bring up large 
pribumi capital into a viable economic entity abreast of, or even replacing the previous 
three main economic actors --- foreign capital, state capital and ethnic Chinese capital. 
There were at least three factors at work behind the shift of emphasis by the Soeharto 
government and Soeharto himself. 
 The first factor was the setback of the state capital expansion strategy after the 
oil booms came to an end. The share of oil and natural gas in Indonesia’s export 
tumbled down after reaching the peak of 82% in 1981. The share of oil and natural gas 
in the state revenue also declined from the peak of 71% in 1981 to around 40% after 
1986. Of the 52 mega projects in the heavy industry that Minister of Industry Soehoed 
had planned, 48 totaling US$ 21 billion in investment value had to be cancelled or 
postponed. The state enterprise sector became subjected to a review from the point of 
view of efficiency and possible privatization. The number of state enterprises began to 
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decrease in 1985. With the state enterprise sector reduced22, the economy was sent back 
into a private capital-led orbit. The important point is that the dwindling of the state 
sector generated lucrative opportunities for private companies. In such public work 
projects as the highway, port, and telephone line construction that had been 
monopolized by state enterprises for long, private companies were now encouraged to 
participate on a BOT (build, operation and transfer) basis. Private companies were 
permitted to participate in the marketing of oil products, and in oil and gas exploitation 
and drilling business, long monopolized by Pertamina. 
 The second factor was the establishment of ethnic Chinese business groups. 
Some of the ethnic Chinese businessmen who continuously expanded business in the 
1970s came to form their business groups by the early 1980s. These groups survived 
the post-oil-boom difficulties at the middle of the 1980s by shifting to export business, 
forming joint ventures with foreign companies, or by cutting off unprofitable business 
lines. They emerged as a dominant driving force of economic growth in the boom led 
by non-oil exports starting from the end of the 1980s. For President Soeharto, this 
situation signified the successful completion of the Chinese capital mobilization policy 
he himself had initiated. Now came the harvesting time to recycle the fruit of their 
success into pribumi society, particularly to foster pribumi capitalists. The public also 
critically saw aggressive diversification of the ethnic Chinese business groups in the 
boom, which was feared to widen a gap with small and medium pribumi capital. They 
called the phenomenon “konglomerasi” (conglomeration), an appellation used 
pejoratively. Voices calling for pribumization became louder.  
 The third factor was inauguration of new enterprises by President Soeharto’s 
second generation. In 1981, his second son Bambang Trihatmodjo established PT 
                             
22  The “strategic industry” under State Minister of Research and Technology Habibie was an 
exception. Ten state enterprises were organized under the Strategic Industry Management Agency 
(Badan Pengelola Industri Strategis: BPIS), an agency set up in 1989 by a Presidential Decree as 
the last stronghold of state-led capitalist industrialization. For the detailed on this agency and ten 
enterprises, see Mihira and Sato ed. [1992:384-407]. 
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Bimantara Citra that later became the holding company of his business group, 
Bimantara Group. His third son, Hutomo Mandala Putra (alias Tommy) in 1984 set up 
PT Humpuss also as the core of his business group, Humpuss Group. Soeharto’s eldest 
daughter Siti Hardijanti Hastuti Rukmana (alias Tutut) in 1987 founded PT Citra 
Marga Nusaphala Persada, a company to undertake the construction of highways on a 
BOT basis on contract with a state enterprise. Soeharto’s second-generation kin joined 
business one after another with great ambitions, and Soeharto himself made all efforts 
to help them become influential pribumi capitalists. Soeharto pleaded that this was how 
public demand for pribumization of economy would be met, and how over-presence of 
ethnic Chinese capitalists would be rectified. It can be considered that Soeharto’s 
scenario was to prepare conditions to smoothly hand down the rein of the state to his 
offspring, specifically the first daughter Tutut, and that he needed to prepare a firm 
economic base for his offspring so as to spare them the need to depend on ethnic 
Chinese economic power. 
 By the end of the 1980s, the Indonesian economy overcame dependence on oil. 
The country entered into a booming period that lasted until 1997, enjoying the benefit 
of foreign investment inflow that began to arrive torrentially in the post-Plaza 
multilateral currency adjustment in East Asia. The economic policies of this period 
were oriented to economic liberalization and private capital utilization. The 
liberalization policies centered on deregulation of trade and investment, such as 
lowered tariffs and abolition of foreign capital restrictions. In addition, the government 
carried out drastic financial liberalization in 1988, liberalizing entry into the banking 
industry. One business group after another set up its own bank. As for private capital 
utilization, the chief policy tool was encouraging private enterprises’ participation in 
public work projects on a BOT basis. It should be noted here that these policies of 
liberalization and private capital utilization did not bring about efficient resource 
allocation by market mechanism as prescribed in textbooks of economics. On the 
contrary, they generated new opportunities for skewed licensing in the benefit of 
specific companies. These opportunities were immediately exploited for the benefit of 
pribumi capital fostering. 
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 Private capital utilization projects provide good illustrations. In most cases 
contractors for these projects were not selected by open bidding. Even when tenders 
were invited, the contract winners were said to be decided by the government agencies 
in charge, which reflected the inclination of their superior, President Soeharto himself. 
Soeharto’s personal involvement in the selection of contractors seems evident in the 
following cases: the first privatized highway project was won in 1987 by the company 
stated above owned by Tutut; the first private company allowed to participate in TV 
broadcasting business was a company belonging to the Bimantara Group; Bimantara 
and Humpuss Groups obtained long-term contracts in 1986 and 1990 on transport of 
Pertamina’s LNG export to South Korea and Taiwan respectively; the Humpuss Group 
was the domestic private pioneer that obtained from Pertamina the concession of oil 
exploitation that had been monopolized by foreign oil giants up to that time. 
 While downstream sectors were subjected to liberalization through tariff cuts, 
protective measures were often strengthened in the midstream and upstream sectors in 
order to deepen import substitution efforts. These protective measures included not 
only import tariffs on intermediary goods and raw materials, but also non-tariff barriers 
in the form of the so-called “concentrated purchase” and “distribution control” (tata 
niaga) systems that limited the right to produce or import goods concerned to a few 
companies. These systems were adopted particularly in the petrochemical and steel 
industries. For instance, the “concentrated purchase” system was applied in 1986-88 to 
the Soeharto family-owned company, giving them the monopoly right to import resins 
as raw materials for plastics. This was done behind the lowering of tariffs on 
downstream plastic products. 
 In the 1990s this type of practice giving privileges to specific pribumi 
companies, particularly those owned by Soeharto family and their kin became 
increasingly frequent. It became customary that when large investment was required, 
state banks would provide necessary loans to the specific businessmen without proper 
screening procedures. While the first and second pribumi favoring policies in the 1970s 
had been only limitedly effective, the third batch was much more substantial, 
lubricating flow of an enormous amount of fund into specific pribumi enterprises. 
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During this period, most of established ethnic Chinese business groups came to keep 
distance from the Soeharto family-linked business, while some aggressive ethnic 
Chinese groups sought chances of government-favored projects joint with rising 
pribumi capitalists and with a large amount of privileged state bank loans. 
 
5. Ownership Structure of Dominant Capital at the End of the Soeharto Era 
 
Throughout the four post-independence periods of Indonesian history, it is evident that 
success or failure of the government intervention in the economic ownership primarily 
depended on whether an economic environment enabling capital accumulation was 
present or not. In this sense, business could not grow on a sustained basis in the first 
two periods in the Soekarno era. In the subsequent two Soeharto periods, Indonesia for 
the first time in the country’s economic history stepped into an environment, thanks to 
Soeharto’s introduction of developmentalist regime, to allow capital accumulation on a 
sustained basis. Throughout the two Soeharto periods, the government intervention 
effect was ensured more by the informal tool of license allocation than by the official 
policies. Ethnic Chinese capital expanded in the first period and some pribumi capital 
caught up in the second period, benefiting from this informal tool used as the leverage. 
The state enterprise sector inherited from the Soekarno period expanded only during 
the oil booms. 
 In the early 1990s, it became clear to everyone that the chief economic actor 
was no longer the state enterprises but private business groups. Ranking high among 
these business groups were ethnic Chinese groups that kept constant capital 
accumulation from the early days of the Soeharto government. Taking business group 
as the unit, the sales of top ethnic Chinese groups came abreast of those of major state 
enterprises. As Table 1 shows, the 1993 annual sales of Salim Group, the largest 
private business group, amounted to Rp18 trillion, a figure close to 21 trillion rupiahs 
which the largest state enterprise Pertamina chalked up that year. The sales of the top 
10 private business groups aggregated 50 trillion rupiahs, which is about the same as 
the total sales of the top 10 state enterprises. If the top 20 from both sectors are taken, 
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the private business groups (Rp 71 trillion) outrivaled their state enterprise counterparts 
(Rp 55 trillion). The aggregate sales of 100 major private business groups standing at 
120 trillion rupiahs not only overwhelmed those of the top 100 state enterprises, but 
also even surpassed the sales of 184 state enterprises which totaled only 73 trillion 
rupiahs. The sales of the top 100 private business groups in fact represented 21% of 
Indonesia’s gross output in 1993, and the share increases to 25% if the sales of top 200 
private groups (Rp142 trillion) are taken as the basis23. In other words, the private big 
business sector as of 1993 represented a quarter of the Indonesian national economy 
and its size was twice as large as that of the state enterprise sector. 
 The stock market in Indonesia does not faithfully reflect the ownership 
composition of Indonesian large business sector. This is partly because not many state 
enterprises and foreign joint ventures are listed. Nevertheless, we can see in Table 1 
that, ethnic Chinese business groups, negative about information disclosure for a long 
time, began to be listed after the stock market was liberalized in 198824. Of the top 20  
                             
23 The ratio of business group sales to GDP is often used as an indicator of the weight the business 
groups carries in the national economy. But this comparison is not adequate as GDP represents the 
total of value added, not sales, of each sector. Besides, this indicator generally exaggerates the 
business groups’ weight and can be misleading. For instance, the share of business group sales to 
GDP in 1993 was 40% for the top 100 groups and 47% for the top 200. We here used the ratio of 
business group sales to gross output, which is the total of gross outputs of the sectors taken from the 
input-output table. But even this indicator is not fully satisfactory as the gross output tends to go up 
as sector classifications are made finer. So we have to note that this ratio, too, serves only to 
approximate the realities. 
24 Before 1988 only 24 companies were listed on the Jakarta Stock Exchange. Most of them were 
originally 100% foreign-owned companies, which then marketed their shares on the stock exchange 
in line with the 1974 Investment Guideline. The number of listed companies rapidly increased after 
the 1988 liberalization policy including relaxed listing conditions. As of 1993 of the Table 1, the 
number of publicly-listed companies was 172, and increased to 282 in 1997. For the liberalization 
policy of stock market and market development, see IDE ed. [1989: 469-470], Sato ed. [2001: 379]. 
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       Table 1             Comparison of Scale Between State-Owned Enterprises, Private Listed Companies and Private Business Groups, 1993
Unit: Rp 1 billion
State-Owned Enterprise  Private Publicly-Listed Company Private Business Group
Name of company Sales Profits Business Name of company Sales Profits Business Name of Name of Sales No.of
business group business group companies
1 PN Pertamina 20,957 1,300 oil & gas  * PT Astra International,Inc. 5,887 132 holding Astra Salim 18,000 450
2 Perum Listrik Negara (PLN) 4,922 180 electric power PT Gudang Garam 3,874 159 cigarette Gudang Garam Astra 5,887 205
3 PT Garuda Indonesia 4,009 408 aviation PT Indocement Tunggal Prakar 2,890 312 cement Salim Sinar Mas    **4,200 150
4 PT Bank Rakyat Indonesia 3,568 106 banking PT Barito Pacific Timber 979 310 plywood Barito Pacific Lippo    **4,750 78
5 PT Bank Negara Indonesia 1946 2,876 241 banking PT Bank Danamon 977 48 banking Danamon Gudang Garam 3,600 16
6 PT Telkom 2,695 361 telecom PT Unilever Indonesia 933 79 oil & fat <foreign> Bob Hasan 3,400 92
7 PT Bank Dagang Negara 2,549 190 banking PT Bank Int'l Indonesia (BII) 876 230 banking Sinar Mas Barito Pacific 3,050 92
8 PT Bank Bumi Daya 2,516 117 banking  * PT United Tractors 857 36 machineryAstra Bimantara 3,000 134
9 PT Bank Pembangunan Indones 1,835 65 banking PT Gajah Tunggal 797 365 tyre Gajah Tunggal Argo Manungga 2,940 54
10 PT Pupuk Sriwijaya 1,765 123 fertilizer PT Central Proteina Prima 757 14 animal feed <foreign> Djarum 2,860 25
11 PT Krakatau Steel 1,651 125 steel PT Lippo Bank 745 42 banking Lippo Dharmala 2,530 151
12 PT Indosat 875 465 telecom PT Polysindo Eka Perkasa 671 105 polyester Texmaco Ongko 2,100 59
13 PT Petrokimia Gresik 740 9 chemical PT Indah Kiat Pulp & Paper 651 90 pulp & paper Sinar Mas Panin 2,081 43
14 PT Tambang Batubara Bukit As 658 206 coal PT Japfa Comfeed Indonesia 649 31 poultry Ometraco,Bimantara Rodamas 2,000 41
15 PT Pembangunan Perumahan 646 40 housing PT Tjiwi Kimia 616 79 paper Sinar Mas Surya Raya 1,975 242
16 PT Bank Tabungan Negara 637 72 banking PT Matahari Putra Prima 592 21 retail Matahari Jan Darmadi 1,940 60
17 PT Taspen 634 94 Insurance PT Hero Supermarket 561 16 retail Hero Berca 1,800 32
18 PT IPTN 618 18 airplane PT Charoen Pokphand Indones 548 29 animal feed <foreign> Humpuss 1,750 11
19 PT Pupuk Kalimantan Timur 434 72 fertilizer PT Bank Umum Nasional 495 29 banking Arya Upaya Gajah Tunggal 1,650 49
20 PT Waskita Karya 401 24 contractor PT Bank Niaga 477 35 banking Soedarpo Raja Garuda Ma 1,590 66
Top 20 total 54,986 4,216 Top 20 total 24,832 2,162 Top 20 total 62,153 2,050
  those affiliated to business gr 22,594 2,040
Top 100 total 70,988 6,100 Top 100 total 38,282 3,737 Top 100 total 119,583 4,263
All state enterprises (184 compani 72,980 6,461 All listed companies (171 compan 40,873 4,105 Top 200 total 141,652 5,834
Note: *On the basis of consolidated accounts with affiliated companies.
  **Remain as the original source is.  
Source: For state-owned enterprises, Warta Ekonomi 6(9), 25 July 1994 / for publicly-listed companies, Warta Ekonomi  6(5), 27 June 1994 / for business groups, Warta Ekonomi  5(48), 25 April 1994.
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listed companies, 17 belonged to business groups. All these groups were ethnic 
Chinese groups excepting Texmaco of Indian origin and two pribumi groups Bimantara 
and Soedarpo. Looking at the top 20 business groups, 18 were ethnic Chinese groups 
and only two pribumi groups, Bimantara placing 8th and Humpuss 18th. The share of 
ethnic Chinese groups was dominant, but diminished if the top 100 groups were taken 
as the basis, that is, 67 Chinese groups out of the 100. It shows that the nearer to the 
pinnacle, the larger the share of ethnic Chinese. (Mihira and Sato ed. [1992: 136-137]) 
 Table 2 provides the owners, size and business lines of high-ranking private 
business groups in terms of annual group sales as of 199625. The Table well reflects the 
course of capital accumulation under the Soeharto regime. While some specific 
pribumi capitalists showed a remarkable catch-up in the 1990s, a dominant force was 
no doubt ethnic Chinese business groups, most of which founded by the early 1970s, 
reflecting the initial stance of the Soeharto government. The ranking order as of 1996 
did not largely change from 1993, but it strikes us that the sales of the top three made a 
drastic breakthrough in 1996, leaving the others far behind. This proves that the 
sustained boom in the 1990s worked more favorably to established big business. There 
were four pribumi-owned business groups of the top 30 groups. Of the four, three were 
exactly the Soeharto family; Bimantara, the largest pribumi business group headed by 
Soeharto’s second son Bambang further rose on the ladder to place 6th; Nusamba 
Group in the 11th place was owned by yayasan (foundation) run by Soeharto; Humpuss 
owned by the third son Tommy stayed in the same 18th. The pribumi capital fostering 
policy from the end of the 1980s succeeded in raising the rank of some pribumi groups 
as high as the top ethnic Chinese groups that had been developed for decades. And this 
success was at once the success of the Soeharto family business. In this sense, the 
success was an extremely localized one. 
 Last let us examine the merits and demerits of the conglomerate phenomenon  
                             
25 Indonesian economic journal Warta Ekonomi was publishing estimated sales ranking of business 
groups every year from 1989, but stopped carrying the ranking list after 1998, supposedly affected 
by the crisis. Table 2 is based on the latest list as of 1996 published in 1997. 
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Sales Name of business group Major Owners Chinese Name / Pribumi Annual Sales Assets No.of Major Business Lines
ranking  (tril.Rp.) (bil.US$) (tril.Rp.) (bil.US$) Companies
1 Salim Soedono Salim Liem Sioe Liong 53.1 22.3 43.1 18.1 600 Food, cement, automobile, banking
2 Astra Barito/Sampurna/Salim Groups 　　　　－ 20.2 8.5 23.7 9.9 125 Automobile, plantation, banking
3 Sinar Mas Eka Tjipta Widjaya Oey Ek Tjhong 20.2 8.5 41.1 17.2 200 Plantation,paper-pulp, financial, real estate
4 Gudang Garam Rachman Halim Tjoa To Hing 9.4 3.9 5.9 2.5 39 Clove cigarette
5 Lippo Mochtar Riady Lee Mo Tie 9.0 3.8 21.1 8.9 70 Financial, real estate
6 Bimantara Bambang Trihatmodjo <pribumi: Soeharto's second son> 4.3 1.8 4.0 1.7 50 Petrochemical, TV broadcast, automobile
7 Gajah Tunggal Sjamsul Nursalim Lim Tek Siong 4.2 1.8 36.3 15.2 80 Tyre, chamical, shrimp breeding, banking
8 Ongko/Bob Hasan Kaharudin Ongko/M.Hasan Ong Ka Huat/The Kian Seng 4.2 1.8 12.9 5.4 55 Financial, real estate, ceramics
9 Djarum Michael Bambang Hartono Oei Hwie Siang 4.0 1.7 2.9 1.2 25 Clove cigarette, financial
10 Rodamas Tan Siong Kie Tan Siong Kie 4.0 1.7 5.9 2.5 40 Glass, seasoning, real estate
11 Nusamba Soeharto's Yayasan <pribumi> 3.9 1.6 6.7 2.8 90 Plantation, plywood
12 Karbe Farma Boenjamin Setiawan Khouw Lip Boen 3.7 1.6 36.8 15.4 60 Pharmaceutical, financial
13 Dharmala Suhargo Gondokusumo Go Ka Him 3.4 1.4 8.5 3.6 130 Trading, animal feed, financial, real estate
14 Argo Manunggal The Ning King The Ning King 3.4 1.4 2.1 0.9 54 Textile
15 Barito Pacific Prajogo Pangestu Phang Dju Phin 2.9 1.2 5.0 2.1 92 Plywood, petrochemical, pulp
16 Maspion Alim Markus Lim Wen Kwang 2.5 1.0 1.8 0.8 35 Alminium products
17 Bakrie Aburizal Bakrie <pribumi> 2.4 1.0 8.4 3.5 76 Steel pipe, plantation, mining, telecom.
18 Humpuss Hutomo Mandala Putera <pribumi: Soeharto's third son> 2.3 1.0 2.1 0.9 40 Oil service, automobile
19 Danamon Usman Admadjaja Njauw Jauw Woe 2.3 1.0 28.4 11.9 33 Financial, real estate
20 Berca Murdaya Widyawimarta Poo Tjie Gwan 2.3 1.0 1.2 0.5 32 Electronics, electric appliace service
21 Panin Mu'min Ali Gunawan Lie Moek Ming 2.2 0.9 8.0 3.4 14 Banking
22 Jan Darmadi Jan Darmadi Fuk Jo Jan 2.2 0.9 6.2 2.6 50 Real estate
23 Jaya Jakarta Provincial Gov./Ciputra <local government>/Tjie Tjien Hoan 2.1 0.9 2.4 1.0 12 Real estate
24 Sampoerna Putera Sampoerna Liem Tien Pao 2.1 0.9 2.2 0.9 37 Clove cigarette
25 Raja Garuda Mas Sukanto Tanoto Lim Sui Hang 2.0 0.8 5.2 2.2 14 Rayon pulp, plantation
26 Texmaco Marimutu Sinivasan <ethnic Indian (Tamil）> 1.8 0.8 5.5 2.3 33 Textile, machinery
27 Metropolitan Ciputra/Budi Brasali Lie Toan Hong 1.7 0.7 2.2 0.9 45 Real estate
Ismail Sofjan <pribumi> 　 　
28 Matahari Hari Darmawan / Lippo Group        n.a. 1.7 0.7 1.6 0.7 25 Retail sale
29 Ometraco Ferry Teguh Santosa Kang Som Tjhiang 1.6 0.7 10.9 4.6 36 Agribusiness, trading, real estate
30 Gemala Sofyan Wanandi Liem Bian Khoen 1.6 0.7 1.1 0.5 81 Automobile component, chemical
34 Modern Samadikun Hartono Ho Sioe Koen 1.5 0.6 4.5 1.9 64 Camera, real estate, financial
36 Harapan Hendra Rahardja Tan Tjoe Hing 1.4 0.6 4.8 2.0 8 Financial, motorcycle
45 Citra Lamtoro Gung Siti Hardijanti Hastuti Rukmana <pribumi: Soeharto's first daughter> 1.0 0.4 3.1 1.3 50 Tollroad
46 Tirtamas Hashim Djojohadikusumo <pribumi: Soeharto's relative by marriage 1.0 0.4 4.7 2.0 55 Financial, petrochemical
87 PSP Trijono Gondokusumo Go Twan Seng 0.6 0.3 3.0 1.3 7 Financial, real estate
Source: Warta Ekonomi , 9(27), 24 Nov. 1997, CISI Raya Utama [1990] and other sources.
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of the Soeharto era. As their business lines in Table 2 indicates, a salient characteristic 
of Indonesian business groups was that they played a locomotive role in 
industrialization by actively investing in the manufacturing sector that involved long 
recovery periods of invested fund. This fact was their first merit. This characteristic 
contrasts with that of big business groups in Singapore and Hong Kong that grew by 
investing mainly in financial, real estates and service sectors (Inoue ed. [1987], Mihira 
and Sato ed. [1992: 124-156]). This was to the credit of the Soeharto government, 
which deliberately induced private, mainly ethnic Chinese, entrepreneurs to invest in 
the manufacturing sector, not only by official industrialization policies in trade and 
investment, but also by discretionary exercise of its licensing power. The second 
positive achievement was that a new stratum of professional managers having 
experience of practical business and strategic thinking emerged in the course of 
sustained growth of business groups. Typical such characters include two key 
economic ministers of the present Megawati government, Laksamana Sukardi, Minister 
in charge of State Enterprises and Rini Mariani Sumarno Soewandi, Minister of Trade 
and Industry. They had served as the top figure of Lippo Bank and PT Astra 
International (the holding company of the Astra group) respectively, and they are both 
pribumi. The third positive achievement was the business groups’ contribution to the 
growth of local capital including small and medium enterprises. This was done through 
inter-firm linkages they developed to procure input goods and to distribute their final 
products 26 . The Salim and Sinar Mas Groups, for instance, enabled smallholder 
plantations to grow by buying oil palm fruits from them as raw materials for the 
groups’ palm oil production. The Astra group stimulated the growth of subcontractors 
by procuring automobile and motorcycle components from them (Sato [1995: 378-380] 
[1996], Thee [1997], Sato [1998]). On the other hand, business groups invited 
                             
26 The general perception in Indonesia is that the rise of business groups impeded the growth of 
small and medium enterprises owing to the resulting oligopolistic market structures. We do not 
intend here to deny this view. Whether business groups impeded or promoted the growth of small 
and medium capital and which effects outweighed are topics to be analyzed independently. 
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criticisms for collusive relations they developed with political power elite and licensing 
authorities, for information secrecy, and for lack of accounting transparency. As the 
hotbed of KKN (corruption, collusion and nepotism), they became the symbol of “bad 
governance” in Indonesia. That was their “vice.” In the post-Soeharto reformasi 
(reform) period, it is this vice aspect that is required to be reformed. 
 
3.  Economic Reform and Ownership Restructuring in the Post-Soeharto 
Period 
 
1. Reform Policies in the Banking and Corporate Sectors 
 
On 21 May 1998, the Soeharto government that lasted for 32 years at last came to an 
end. In the previous year, July 1997, the Asian currency crisis spread to Indonesia, and 
the Indonesian government agreed to be supported by IMF on 31 October. Before long, 
however, the currency crisis developed into the political crisis due to President 
Soeharto’s health decline and his antagonism against IMF, and further into the broader 
social economic crisis. By the collapse of the Soeharto government, the country’s 
currency, the rupiah, tumbled by up to 80% from the pre-crisis value. The corporate 
sector, hit hard by the swelling burdens in rupiahs of repaying dollar-denominated 
borrowings, became unable to service debts owed to overseas creditors. Owing to 
sharp rises in import prices and contraction of domestic demand, most companies 
engaging in domestic business made financial losses and fell insolvent to domestic 
banks. Deteriorating solvency of borrower companies rapidly increased non-
performing loans of domestic banks. Eventually banks too became insolvent, as the 
high interest rate policy to defend the rupiah, which jacked up interest rates to 80% a 
year, undermined their profits. The corporate sector and the banking sector thus 
collapsed concurrently. 
 The government set out to reform the economy in accordance with the 
conditionality of IMF. The IMF policies comprise macroeconomic stabilization policy 
and economic restructuring policy centering on the reform of the banking and 
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corporate sectors27. The reform of banks and corporations is in practice an intervention 
policy in economic ownership, as it is dramatically transforming the ownership 
structure of these sectors. In the economic reform policies of the post-Soeharto 
governments led by the Presidents B.J.Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati 
Soekarnoputri, this section focuses on the banking and corporate reform and their 
achievements. 
 Indonesia’s reform of the banking and corporate sectors is characterized by 
the strong leadership being displayed by a government agency, the Indonesian Bank 
Restructuring Agency (IBRA, or Badan Penyehatan Perbankan Nasional, BPPN). 
IBRA was established under the jurisdiction of the minister of finance in early 1998 in 
line with the IMF prescription. The main tasks of IBRA are firstly to restore banks’ 
financial health by taking over their irrecoverable loans and to restructure the banking 
sector, and secondly to dispose corporate debts to domestic banks that were transferred 
to IBRA. This IBRA’s work is not only the post-crisis reform process of the banking 
and corporate sectors, but also the process of dismantling the micro-economic 
structure formed under the Soeharto regime. This is because the ownership structure in 
these sectors is deeply connected to the structure of vested interests that supported the 
regime. 
 More than five years have passed since the downfall of the Soeharto 
government, but the process of restructuring ownership structure is still under way. 
Although the post-restructuring shape is not fully clear, the major changes show a 
decline of big private capital and its replacement with state and foreign capital. The 
                             
27 As for macroeconomic stabilization policy, restoring fiscal health with reduction of state budget 
deficits is a major task to be tackled. Government finance is closely linked with the reform of banks 
and corporations. Interests on state bonds issued in large amounts for the banking restructuring are a 
heavy burden on the state finance while, conversely, revenue by sale of government-controlled 
indebted companies’’ assets helps fill fiscal deficits. Smooth progress of the banking and corporate 
reform, therefore, is a necessary condition for fiscal sustainability. As to the relationship between 
the government finance and bonds, see Usui [2000]. 
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resulting structural changes that have taken place up to the moment are examined 
below. 
 
2. Separation of Banks and Business Groups 
 
The first outcome of IBRA’s restructuring efforts is the realignment of the ownership 
structure of the banking sector. Using the capital adequacy ratio (CAR: the ratio of 
equity capital to risk-weighted total assets) and the number of customers as the 
yardsticks, IBRA classified all commercial banks into the three categories: banks to be 
closed, banks to be restructured, and banks to be allowed to operate as they are. There 
are two ways of restructuring, capital injection (“recapitalization”) by the government 
and nationalization. In the case of capital injection, 80% of capital needed to improve 
CAR to 4 % was put up by the government and the remaining 20% by bank owners. 
The government nationalized some major private banks whose closures were feared to 
have the far-reaching impacts and infused capital after merging them into a few banks. 
All the state-owned banks, which had the lowest CAR, were also injected capital after 
4 out of them being merged into one. Irrecoverable loan claims (overdue debts over 
270 days) of all banks to be restructured were transferred to IBRA to allow them 
improve their balance sheets. By the time all these procedures were completed at the 
end of 2000, a total of 67 private banks were closed, 13 banks were nationalized. The 
government injected capital into a total of 27 banks including 7 private banks, 4 state 
banks, 4 nationalized banks and 12 regional development banks. The number of banks 
operating fell from the peak level of 240 at the end of 1996 to 164 at the end of 2000. 
 Table 3 shows how the ownership structure of the banking sector changed 
through IBRA’s bank restructuring. The remarkable development shown in the table is 
the decline of private banks affiliated with business groups. Immediately before the 
crisis, banks affiliated with business groups numbered 58, accounting for as much as 
40% of assets held by all commercial banks. In the private banking sector, they 
accounted for less than 40% in number but 77% of total assets. Of these business 
group affiliated banks, 28 were closed, 10 were nationalized, and 4 received the capital  
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    Table 3              Change of Ownership Structure of the Banking Sector in Indonesia, 1997 and 1999
--- Decline of the Business Group Affiliated Banks ---
Ownership Before restructuring (1997.6) After restructuring (1999.12)
No. of banks Assets % of assets No. of banks Assets % of assets
(unit) (Rp billion) (%) (unit) (billion Rp (%)
Government Total 28 613,506 78.4
State-owned bank 7 187,085 36.9  State-owned bank 5 2) 365,447 46.7
 Recapitalized bank 19 3) 93,487 12.0
 Nationalized bank 4 4) 154,572 19.8
Private Total 155 263,472 52.0 Total 70 5) 61,089 7.8
 Business group affiliated1) 58 201,939 39.8  Business group affiliated1) 16 13,522 1.7
 Independent bank 97 61,533 12.1  Independent bank 54 47,567 6.1
Foreign Total 41 42,765 8.4 Total 40 5) 99,358 12.7
 Foreign bank branch 10 19,247 3.8  Foreign bank branch 10 63,186 8.1
 Foreign joint bank 31 23,517 4.6  Foreign joint bank 30 36,172 4.6
Regional Regional development bank 26 13,486 2.7 Regional development bank 14 5) 8,294 1.1
Total All commercial banks 229 506,808 100.0 All commercial banks 152 782,247 100.0
Note:     1) Classified by the author based on the names of shareholders in CISI Raya Utama [1999]. Panin bank is classified as independent, 
since Panin Group centers on the banking industry.
             2) Composed of 1 recapitalized bank after merger of 4 banks, 3 recapitalized banks and 1 newly established bank.
             3) Composed of 7 private banks (of these, 4 are affiliated with business groups) and 12 regional development banks.
             4) 13 private banks (of these, 10 are affiliated with business groups) were nationalized and 9 out of these were mergered with others.
             5) Represents the number of banks which continued with no measures of restructuring.
Source: Calculated by the author based on Ekofin Konsulindo [2000].
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injection. Those were allowed to continue operations with no ownership change 
account for only 2% of the total assets. Although nationalized and recapitalized banks 
are to be reverted to private banks over time, government-held equity stakes in these 
banks are to be sold off to third parties. So these banks will be no longer owned by a 
single business group. 
 As a result of the bank restructuring, the asset base of the private banking 
sector contracted. Also, the integrated ownership structure linking banks to business 
groups, that formed the foundation of the private banking sector, all but disappeared. 
The structure was traced back to the establishment of affiliated banks one after another 
by business groups when the entry barrier into the banking sector was lifted under the 
financial liberalization policy of October 1988 (called Pakto). This particular 
ownership structure caused rampant intra-group lending of group banks to affiliated 
companies among some major business groups in the 1990s. It was reported that the 
banks owned by Gajah Tunggal Group, Ongko Group, Modern Group (all banks 
closed in August 1998) loaned their fund to group affiliated companies as much as 
90%, 78%, 63% of the total loans respectively in order28. After the restructuring, most 
of business groups have lost affiliated banks. Private banks are now categorized into 
non-group independent banks, banks jointly owned by some business groups, and 
banks sold off to consortiums of foreign and local investors. Thus the ownership of 
banks and business groups was separated. 
 
3. Reorganization of Indebted Business Groups 
 
The second outcome of the IBRA policy is the reorganization of some business groups 
                             
28 Kontan, 24 August 1998. But the author failed to verify the intra-group lending by Ekofin 
Konsulindo’s database on banks. We cannot specify how individual banks make distinction 
between “loans to related companies” and “loans to third parties” in their dutifully disclosed 
financial statements. There is a possibility that the real state of the banks’ loans to group-affiliated 
companies was not reflected in the disclosed data. See also Hamada [2003]. 
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that depended on massive borrowing from domestic banks. During the course of the 
bank restructuring described above, irrecoverable loans of the recapitalized banks, 
together with all outstanding loan claims held by the closed banks, were transferred to 
IBRA. The total sum of these loans amounted to 284 trillion rupiahs (US$ 32.5 billion) 
as of June 2000, or some 50% of all bank loans outstanding in Indonesia, involving 
some 130,000 debtor companies. IBRA classified debtor companies by shareholder 
that was called “obligor”. It was found that 21 largest obligors (mostly business group 
owners) listed in Table 4 accounted for 30% of the total debts, and 50 largest obligors 
accounted for 45% of the total debts. Of the top 11 obligors, eight had close ties with 
former President Soeharto, including his third and second sons. The eight obligors 
break down into four pribumi, three ethnic Chinese and one ethnic Indian. These 
heavily indebted business groups were mostly newly-emerging or rapid-growth groups. 
By lender, state banks accounted for 54% of all loan claims under IBRA. Thus, with 
numerical evidence, domestic banks proved to channel massive loans to specific 
business groups in the boom period of the 1990s. In particular, business group owners 
with easy access to the center of power in the Soeharto regime obtained large loans 
mainly from state banks without proper screening. 
 These business groups were subjected to intensive debt repayment 
negotiations with IBRA. IBRA basically seeks debt disposal through such methods as 
repayment by cash or sale of assets, debt rescheduling, debt to bond (convertible 
corporate bonds) swap, and debt to equity swap. In dealing with obligors “not 
cooperative” in repayment talks, IBRA is authorized to file bankruptcy suits29, seize 
assets, or take obligors into ‘debt custody’ (lembaga paksa badan; revival of the legal  
                             
29  To facilitate lawsuits on bankruptcy, the Indonesian government, following the IMF 
conditionality, introduced a revised bankruptcy law (Law No.4 1998) and established the 
commercial courts in 1998. The first commercial court started to work in September 1998. By May 
2002, IBRA brought 68 bankruptcy cases to the commercial courts, and 2,125 cases to the civil 
courts (http://www.bppn.go.id/indonesia/pk_ru_tindakanhukum.asp). The results of judgment are 
not disclosed by IBRA, but the ratio of cases that IBRA won is said to be not high. 
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Table 4                     The 21 Largest Obligors from the Domestic Banking Sector, as of Nov.2001
No.of % of % of
Name of Name of Obligor Debt debtor agreement court Main Business Sales Features of owner-manager
Business Group (Business Group Owner) value companieswith IBRA dispute ranking [C:Chinese, P:priubmi, I:Indian]
(Rp tril.) (unit) (%) (%) 1996
1 Texmaco Marimutu Sinivasan 17.3 17 99.9        - textile,machinery 28 Ｉ close to Soeharto
2 Barito Pacific Prajogo Pangestu 8.6 18 93.4        - plywood,chemical 15 C close to Soeharto and Tutut
3 Humpuss Hutomo Mandala Putra 6.0 19 41.9 54.3 LNG 17 P Soeharto's third son
4 Bob Hasan Mohamad Hasan 6.2 15 99.7        - plywood  7 C Soeharto's close friend
5 Bakrie Abrizal Bakrie 6.1 24 71.0        - steelpipe 20 P close to Soeharto family
6 PSP Trijono Gondokusumo 4.2 15 13.0 76.7 real estate 79 C Dharmala's third son
7 Tirtamas Hashim Djojohadikusumo 4.3 12 66.4 29.3 cement,chemical 44 P relative of Soeharto family
8 Napan Henry Pribadi 3.6 16 92.4 1.1 chemical 47 C co-owner of Salim
9 Tirtobumi Murtomo Basuki 2.9 1        -        - tollroad      - C
10 Djajanti Burhan Uray 2.9 8 100.0        - plywood,fishery 48 C
11 Bimantara Bambang Trihatmodjo 3.2 10 65.4 19.9 broadcast 6 P Soeharto's second son
12 Raja Garuda Mas Sukanto Tanoto 2.6 10 96.3        - paper/pulp 24 C
13 Bahana (State-owned enterprise) 2.9 6 98.8        - venture capital      - -              -
14 Dharmala Suhargo Gondokusumo 3.0 29 22.8 69.3 trade, real estate 13 C born in Mainland
15 Ongko Kaharudin Ongko 3.7 19 6.7 81.3 finance, real estate 9 C partly financed by Bob Hasan
16 Gunung Sewu Dasuki Angkosubroto 3.4 16 89.6        - real estate 59 C relative of Dharmala
17 Danamon Usuman Admadjaja 3.1 17 94.3        - finance, real estate 23 C close to Soeharto,Salim
18 Nugra Santana Ponco Sutowo 2.2 6 24.2 75.8 real estate 35 P son of former Pertamina president
19 Kodel Sugen Sarjadi 1.0 4 94.0        - real estate 109 P co-investment of 8 pribumi
20 Rajawali Peter Sondakh 2.9 11 97.1        - telecom 43 C
21 Argo Manunggal The Ning King 2.1 23 100.0        - textile 12 C many Japanese joint ventures
Total of the 21 largest obligors 91.7 296 74.5 16.6
( % of total )     (29.5)   (  0.2)
Total of the 50 largest obligors 139.8        n.a. 58.4 14.0
( % of total )     (45.0)
Total corporate debts under IBRA 310.7 130,000 32.2 10.4
    (100.0) (100.0)
Source:  IBRA [Dec.2001], IBRA Homepage (http://www.ibra.go.id) and other sources.
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system during the Dutch East Indies’ rule under which a creditor can seek a court 
warrant of imprisonment of a debtor). In fact, IBRA brought before court the bulk of 
debts owed by Ongko Group and PSP Group that were not cooperative (Table 4). The 
founder of Dharmala Group and his eldest son were taken into debt custody, and some 
of the group’s assets were seized. On the other hand, however, IBRA took a lenient 
measure of special debt-equity swaps and long-term debt rescheduling for several 
business groups that undertook big projects in the capital goods and material industries, 
in accordance with the decision made by the Abdurrahman Wahid government. This 
included Texmaco Group, the largest obligor operating synthetic fiber and machinery 
factories, Tirtamas Group undertaking a petrochemical project, and PT Chandra Asri, 
the country’s first ethylene center run by Barito Pacific Group. 
 IBRA announced that, by the end of 2002, IBRA reached agreements on 
repayment of debts amounting to 240 trillion rupiahs, or 65% of the total debts that 
swelled to 368 trillion rupiahs on the book value basis. But, the amount that IBRA 
already recovered from debtors was merely 61 trillion rupiahs on the realized market 
value basis, or 25% of the amount agreed. Thus IBRA’s efforts in corporate debt 
disposal have not necessarily progressed straightforward and have not yielded high 
recovery. However, the work at least helped dismantle the back-scratching alliance 
that had been developed through bank loans among the power elite, state banks, and 
specific business group owners as listed here during the latter half of the Soeharto era. 
 
4. Break-up of Ethnic Chinese Business Groups with Bank Holdings 
 
The third outcome of IBRA’s restructuring work was the dissolution of some leading 
ethnic Chinese business groups. In addition to the bank restructuring and disposal of 
corporate debts, IBRA is charged with another task. The task is to make some bank 
owners repay liquidity support loans that they received from the central bank to cope 
with bank runs amid the economic crisis. In 1998, the Habibie government decided to 
have 9 owners of 8 banks that received the special central bank loans but were later 
closed or nationalized repay the loans in full within four years in cash or by sale of 
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assets, and concluded the repayment contracts with the bank owners concerned. These 
bank owners were at the same time the owner-managers of business groups. IBRA 
forced the bank owners to place major assets of their business groups equivalent to the 
repayment amounts under its control. IBRA were then to sell the assets off and to put 
the revenues into the National Treasury as repayments of the central bank loans. 
 The decision taken by the Habibie government was far harsher than measures 
to deal with corporate debts owed by the major obligors, which allowed for debt 
reductions or debt rescheduling. It was based on the thinking that the bank owners 
should repay the full amounts of the loans to the state within the prescribed period, in 
exchange for the immunity from prosecution granted for their violations of regulations 
regarding intra-group lending to affiliate companies. However, apparently lying behind 
the harsh measure was the fact that Salim Group, the largest business group and also 
the symbol of ethnic Chinese businessmen with “Soeharto connections”, was the 
largest debtor among the nine bank owners.  
 Table 5 lists the nine owners of the eight banks subjected to this repayment 
measure. The central bank loans the nine bank owners had to repay total 113 trillion 
rupiahs on the book value basis30 , larger than the total of 92 trillion rupiahs of 
corporate debts owed by the 21 largest obligors. The bank owners were forced to put 
under IBRA’s control most of the assets of their business groups in the form of shares 
they held in a total of 228 companies. Of the nine bank owners, seven are ethnic 
Chinese and two are pribumi. But the two pribumi people are the co-owner-managers 
of Salim Group since its establishment, and one of them, Sudwikatmono is a nephew 
of former President Soeharto. In short, all the nine people were involved in the 
ownership and management of the ethnic Chinese business groups. The business 
groups of Salim, Gajah Tunggal, Ongko and Bob Hasan were in the top 10 ranking of 
annual sales before the crisis (see Table 2). Bank Central Asia (BCA) owned by Salim 
                             
30 The total amount of debts that had to be repaid by bank owners increased to 131 trillion rupiahs, 
as IBRA added another 35 owners of 25 smaller banks as an object of this central bank loan 
repayment scheme in 2000. 
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Group and Bank Danamon owned by Danamon Group were the top private banks, 
together accounting 25% of the total assets in the private bank sector in June 1997 
before the crisis. These influential business groups that formed a part of ethnic Chinese 
dominant capital that had been accumulated during the Soeharto era not only lost the 
core bank units but also were to be broken up to the extent of having no trace of their 
original form. 
 
 
 Table 6 shows how their assets were disposed of. There were a total of 39 
cases of asset sales by the end of 2001, with the 31 cases related to the assets of Salim 
Group, accounting for as much as 98% of the sale proceeds. Salim Group has the 
central bank loans to repay far larger than other bank owners, amounting to 52 trillion 
rupiahs, or 47% of the total. The share holdings in 108 companies in the business 
group were submitted to IBRA for sale. These shares were and being disposed of 
mainly through (1) sale on the overseas stock markets; (2) purchases by foreign 
partners of joint ventures (U.S., Japan, the Netherlands, South Korea, etc.); (3) Asian 
and European businesses newly entering Indonesia through open bidding (Singapore, 
Malaysia, and Germany); (4) newly established domestic investment and asset 
management companies (most of them are partnerships between Indonesian asset 
managers and foreign and local investors); and (5) indirect buybacks by Salim (in PT 
Indofood, the Indonesia’s largest food company, and the group’s overseas 
                    Table 5             Banks / Business Groups Subjected to Repayment of Central Bank Loans
 
Name of private banks Bank owner Name of Debt value No.of Name of holding company
subjected to repayment measure (owner-manager of business group companies under the control of IBRA
business group) (trillion Rp.) to be sold off
Bank Central Asia (BCA) Soedono Salim Salim 52.6 108 PT. Holdiko Perkasa
Bank Dagang Nasional Indonesia (BDNI) Sjamsul Nursalim Gajah Tunggal 28.4 12 PT. Tunas Sepadan Investama
Bank Danamon Usman Admadjaja Danamon 12.5 27 PT. Bentala Kartika Abadi
Bank Umum Nasional (BUN) Kaharuddin Ongko Ongko 8.3 21 PT. Arya Mustika Mulia Abadi
Bank Umum Nasional (BUN) Mohammad Hasan Bob Hasan 5.3 30 PT. Kiani Wildha
Bank Modern Samadikun Hartono Modern 2.7 10 PT. Cakrawala Gita Pratama
Bank Surya Sudwikatmono* Subentra 1.9 6                    -
Bank Risjad Salim International (RSI) Ibrahim Risjad* Risjadson 0.6 4                    -
Bank Hokindo Hokiarto/ Hokianto Hokindo 0.3 10 PT. Hoswarya Persada
Total 112.6 228
Note: Two with the mark * are pribumi  and co-owner-managers of Salim Group. The rest 7 are the ethnic Chinese.
Source: IBRA [2000] and other sources.
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     Table 6                       Sales of Assets of Bank Shareholders Subjected to Repayment of Central Bank Loans, as of the end of 2001
Rupiah
 Time Company sold off Business group Line of business Buyer of assets equivalent Rp US $ HK $
of sales (bil) (bil) (mil) (mil)
1 1999 PT Pacific Indomas Plastic Indonesia Salim polystyrene manufacturing Dow Chemical (US) 32        - 4     -
2 1999 PT Standard Toyo Polymer Salim PVC resin manufacturing Mitsui Co. / Toso (Japan) 114        - 15     -
3 1999 PT Gatari Air Services Bob Hasan chartering aviation services               n.a. 20        - 3     -
4 1999 PT Indo American Ceramics Ongko ceramics manufacturing               n.a. 39        - 6     -
5 1999.7 PT Indofood Sukses Makmur Tbk. Salim the largest food company via HK stock market to First Pacific 380 380        -     -
6 2000.3 PT Astra International Tbk. Salim/Danamon holding company of Astra Group C&C Ltd.(Singapore) 2,948        - 389     -
7 2000.8 BCA building Salim headquater building of BCA Keppel Land Ltd.(Singapore) 280 280        -     -
8 2000.8/10 First Pacific Company Ltd. Salim headquarter of overseas business public (HK stock market) 581        - 69     -
9 2000.9 PT Karimun Granite Salim granite mining PT Pendawa Sempurna (former owner) 22 22        -     -
10 2000.9 PT Salim Rengo Containers Salim corrugated  carton manufacturing Rengo (Japan) 204 204        -     -
11 2000.11 PT Danamon Mobil & Pembiayaan Danamon automobile finance               n.a. 58 58        -     -
12 2000.11 QAF Ltd. Salim multi-national food and retailing company via Singapore market to QAF management (Singapore) 191        -        - 36
13 2000.11 Salim Oleochemical Group Salim 7 companies of palm oil oleochemical PT Bhakti Investama (Indonesia) 1,143        - 127     -
14 2000.11 Indomilk Group Salim 2 companies of dairy products mfg. NV Marison (Netherland) 400 400        -     -
15 2000.11 PT Indomiwon Salim monosodium glutamate mfg. Daesang (Korea) 80        - 9     -
16 2000.11 Mosquito Coil Group Salim 5 companies of mosquito coil mfg. Reckitt Benckiser Plc (UK) 610 610        -     -
17 2000.12 Kavling Tanah Cinere Ongko housing development               n.a. 1 1        -     -
18 2000.12 PT Asuransi Aetna Life Indonesia Danamon life insurance PT ING Insurance (Indonesia) 12 12        -     -
19 2000.12 PT Landbanks Properties Modern real estate development               n.a. 8 8        -     -
20 2000.12 PT Danamon Sanatel Danamon telecomunication PT Gemawidia Statindo Komputer (Indonesia) 39 39        -     -
21 2001.2 PT Cilicon Griyanugraha Modern housing development               n.a. 6 6        -     -
22 2001.2 First Pacific Company Ltd. Salim headquarter of overseas business public (HK stock market) 94        -        - 67
23 2001.3 Salim Palm Plantation Salim 25 companies of oil palm plantations Kumpulan Guthrie (Malaysia) 3,647        - 368     -
24 2001.3 PT Indocoal Salim 4 companies of coal mining PT Centralink Wisesa Int'l (Indonesia) 472        - 46     -
25 2001.4 PT Indocement Tunggal Prakarsa Tbk. Salim/Subentra the largest cement mfg. company subsidiary of Heidelberger Zement AG(Germany 1,080 605 44     -
26 2001.4 PT Indomarco Prismatama Salim food and consumer goods distribution Bhakti Asset Management (Indonesia) 162 162        -     -
27 2001.5 PT Indopoly Swakarsa Industries Salim polypropylene film manufacturing Jefflyne Golden Holding (Singapore) 321        - 29     -
28 2001.5 Yunnan Kunlene Film Industries Salim polypropylene film mfg. in China Jefflyne Golden Holding (Singapore) 158        - 14     -
29 2001.6 PT Kerismas Witikco Makmur Salim galvanized sheet manufacturing PT Sentralindo Bumi Persada (Indonesia) 297 297        -     -
30 2001.11 PT Indosiar Visual Mandiri Tbk. Salim TV broadcasting PT TDM Aset Manajemen (Indonesia) 755 755        -     -
31 2001.11 PT Gumindo Perkasa Industri Salim seaweed processing Ridwan Soeriyadi (co-owner, Indonesia) 17        - 2     -
32 2001.11 PT Poli Contindo Nusa Salim oil drum manufacturing PT Kerismas Witikco Makmur (Indonesia) 50 50        -     -
33 2001.11 Guandong Jiangmen ISN Salim glass sheet mfg. in China Feature Technology Ltd. (Singapore) 286        - 34     -
34 2001.11 Riau Industrial Estate Group Salim 3 companies of Batam/Bintang estates PT Dwi Sinergi Utama (Indonesia) 710 710        -     -
35 2001.11 Sugar Group Salim 2 companies of sugar mfg. and plantations Trimanunggal-Garuda consortium (Indonesia) 1,160 1,160        -     -
36 2001.12 PT Yakult Indonesia Persada Salim lactic acid drink manufacturing Yakult (Japan) 60 60        -     -
37 2001.12 PT Berdikari Sari Utama Salim flour milling ATS consortium (USA) 225 166 6     -
38 2001.12 Sulfindo Group Salim 4 companies of vinylalkali (petrochemical) Durability Enterprise Ltd. (HK) 345        - 41     -
39 2001.12 PT Indomobil Sukses Int'l Tbk. Salim automobile and motorcycle mfg. Trimegah consortium (Indonesia) 625 625        -     -
Total sales revenue 17,632 6,610 1,206 103
Source:  Compiled from IBRA, Monthly Report , July 2001 / IBRA Homepage (http://www.ibra.go.id).
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headquarters in Hong Kong and Singapore, First Pacific Company Ltd. and QAF Ltd. 
respectively). All told, foreign investors are the principal buyers of assets being sold 
off. The results of the asset sales amounted to 18 trillion rupiahs at the end of 2001 and 
slightly increased to 23 trillion rupiahs by the end of 2002, but the recovery ratio to the 
total debt value was only 18%. Besides, there has been little progress in asset sales of 
debtors other than Salim and two smaller groups (Subentra and Risjadson).  
 Compared with other business groups, the dismantling of Salim Group had 
several distinct features. First, developments that led to the central bank loans for BCA 
were highly political. BCA was a top private bank, leading the Indonesia’s banking 
sector in the number of branches, computerization of operations, information 
technology, and management capabilities. Still, the bank had to take in the central 
bank loans because of a major run that started in the turmoil preceding the downfall of 
President Soeharto, triggered apparently by the close ties with Soeharto kept by Liem 
Sioe Liong, the group’s founder, and the fact that Soeharto’s eldest daughter and eldest 
son were among BCA shareholders. Second, strong opposition to the repurchase of 
group assets by the owners was seen particularly for Salim Group. Salim Group had to 
drop plans to join open tender because its participation was deemed morally 
problematic by Indonesia’s parliament, political parties, top officials in IBRA and the 
central bank. The backlash can be interpreted as a display of pribumi nationalism 
against the revival of ethnic Chinese conglomerates that flourished during the Soeharto 
era.  
 
5. Declining Large Private Capital, Rising State and Foreign Capital 
 
Table 7 summarizes the restructuring of banks and companies affiliated with the high-
ranking business groups. The table provides the following four points as aspects of the 
structural changes. 
 Firstly, most of the business groups have lost their bank units. Before the 
crisis, 28 out of the 35 groups listed in the table had one or more affiliated banks. After 
the restructuring, only Panin Group and Lippo Group have banking operations as one 
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of their principal businesses. But Lippo Bank, now under the supervision of IBRA as a 
recapitalized bank, may still lose a group status after government-held majority shares 
are sold off. Gudang Garam, Djarum and Maspion Groups also keep bank units, but 
these banks are only peripheral to these groups and to the banking industry as a whole. 
The separation of business groups and banks can be reaffirmed from this table. 
 Secondly, among the 21 largest obligors heavily depending on domestic bank 
borrowing, about half can be found in the business groups listed from 6th to 19th place 
in the table. These groups are under intense pressure for the disposal of their assets. In 
particular, the position of the Soeharto family businesses is on the decline, including 
Humpuss Group, which could not stay as a business group after the departure of 
founder and Soeharto’s third son, the second son’s Bimantara Group, and Nusamba 
Group owned by foundations run by Soeharto. Dharmala Group and PSP Group, 
categorized as “uncooperative” by IBRA, are finding it difficult to stay in business. 
Three business groups that were accorded the special measures of debt restructuring 
for their big projects, namely, Texmaco, Tirtamas, and Barito Pacific Groups, still 
continue these businesses. But even these groups are cutting back on other group 
business operations. 
 Thirdly, as higher-ranking business groups had higher dependence on 
overseas borrowing with lower funding costs, the varying degrees of the skill in 
handling external debt influenced the corporate survival. A good example of success is 
Astra Group. The group has managed to successfully negotiate debt rescheduling and 
reduction accords with a consortium of foreign creditors. On top of this, the group was 
able to restructure its operations and finance through the sale of non-core businesses 
and the sale of shares to Japanese joint venture partners in the core machinery business. 
On the contrary, Sinar Mas Group with highly competitive export business in paper-
pulp and palm oil fell into financial difficulties, after its policy to turn the paper-pulp 
business into multinational operations using huge external borrowings backfired in the 
wake of the fall in international prices. Loans to a group paper-pulp holding company 
by a group bank that received the capital injection turned sour, bringing in IBRA to 
dispose of the bad loans. The group eventually was forced to transfer most of its paper-
IDE Research Paper No. 4, September 2003                                        Table 7                      Reorganization of Major Business Groups, as of 2001
 Domestic debts (trillion Rp.)(unit) External debts Restructuring
Ranking Name of business group Unpayable Repayment of central estimated value measure for present situations of reorganization
as of 96 debt from bank loans No.of co. as of end of 1997 group-affiliated
banks 1) 2) sold off (billion US $) banks 3)
1 Salim 0.6 52.6 (108) 5.5 nationalized Selling assets to repay central bank loans and external debts
2 Astra    ** 0.4 - 5.1 merger after capital injection Rescheduled external debts/capital increase by Japanese JV partners
3 Sinar Mas    ** 0.7 - 3.8 capital injection  Selling assets to repay external debts 
4 Gudang Garam      - -                     n.a.continue No problem
5 Lippo 0.6 - 3.2 capital injection  
6 Bimantara     * 3.1 - 0.5 closed A part of domestic debt repayment not yet agreed with IBRA 
7 Gajah Tunggal    ** 1.5 28.4 ( 12) 3 closed / closed Selling assets to repay central bank loans
8 Ongko/Bob Hasan     * 2.7 13.7 ( 51)                     n.a.closed Selling assets to repay central bank loans/bankruptcy suit
9 Djarum 0.2 -                     n.a.continue
10 Rodamas      - - 1.05      - No problem
11 Nusamba/Bob Hasan     * 5.2 - 1.7 capital injection / continue Soeharto's suit dismissed/Bob Hasan found guilty and imprisoned
12 Karbe Farma 0.2 -                     n.a.      -
13 Dharmala     * 2.7 **0.2 0.65 closed Debt custody regarded as uncooperative by IBRA/bankruptcy suit
14 Argo Manunggal     * 1.9 **0.1 3.2 closed / continue Rescheduled external and domestic debts
15 Barito Pacific     * 8.4 - 0.45 closed Special debt equity swap measure for a petrochemical project
16 Maspion 0.0 -                     n.a.continue No problem
17 Bakrie     * 6.0 - 1.5 nationalized Equity swap of external debts/rescheduled domestic debts
18 Humpuss     * 5.7 - 0.4      - Debt repayment by assets/Tommy arrested and left from ownership
19 Danamon     * 3.0 12.5 ( 27) 1.8 nationalized Selling assets to repay central bank loans
20 Berca      - -                     n.a.      - No problem
21 Panin 0.4 -                     n.a.continue
22 Jan Darmadi 0.0 -                     n.a.      - No problem
23 Jaya 0.1 -                     n.a.closed / nationalized
24 Sampurna      - - 0.35 sold before crisis No problem
25 Raja Garuda Mas     * 2.7 - 0.5 closed Rescheduled debts/closed pulp factory due to environmental problem
26 Texmaco     * 17.3 - 1.5 closed Special debt equity swap measure for domestic debts
27 Metropolitan    ** 1.2 -                     n.a.      -
28 Matahari 0.1 -                     n.a.      -
29 Ometraco 0.9 -                     n.a.nationalized
30 Gemala 0.6 -                     n.a.closed
34 Modern    ** 1.0 2.7 ( 10)                     n.a.closed Selling assets to repay central bank loans/debt equity swap
36 Harapan 0.0 -                     n.a.closed Not enabled to continue as a business group due to bank industry closed
45 Citra Lamtoro Gung    ** 0.9 **0.2 0.6 closed A part of assets seized/Tollroad BOT projects revised
46 Tirtamas     * 3.9 - 2.0 nationalized/closed Debt equity swap for a petrochemical project/bankruptcy suit
87 PSP     * 4.9 **3.0                     n.a.closed Regarded as uncooperative and repayment not agreed with IBRA/bankruptcy suit
Note:      1) * indicates the 21 largest debtors, ** the 50 largest debtors, and  - no unpayable debt.
    2) * indicates groups newly added in 2000 as an object for the central bank loan repayment obligation.
    3) The cases with two measures indicates that the group had two or more affiliated banks.  - means that the group had no banks.
Source: IBRA [various months] [2001], articles in Kompas and other sources.
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pulp assets under the control of IBRA. Bakrie Group also had to transfer most of 
profitable businesses into the hands of foreign creditors as a result of debt equity 
swaps. 
 Fourthly, the business groups required to repay the central bank liquidity 
support loans in full were to loose a major part of their group businesses. 
 Through these four major causes, Indonesia’s business groups went downhill 
after they have flowered in the 1990s with uninterrupted growth during the Soeharto 
era. This represents a major setback for large private capital in the ownership structure 
of the national economy. 
 The similar trend can be detected in the changes in the ownership structure of 
publicly-listed companies in the Jakarta Stock Exchange. Table 8 classifies listed 
companies into three categories ---domestic private, foreign and state-owned 
companies--- by the largest shareholder and compares the ownership composition 
between 1996 and 199931. The comparison clearly shows the shift of ownership from 
private capital to foreign and state capital with the progress of corporate restructuring. 
The composition of domestic private companies has declined in every indicator, while 
the composition of foreign and state-owned companies increased. Although 
composition of assets did not rise significantly for foreign companies, there were 
evident increases in the composition of sales and of the number of employees. This 
indicates the rapid advances of foreign companies or growing foreign shareholdings in 
local private companies, accompanied with increasing utilization of low-cost labor. 
The composition of state-owned companies is also rising conspicuously in assets, 
mainly because major private banks were nationalized or recapitalized. 
 There seem to be two categories of large private businesses that are likely to 
survive the present challenges. The first category is companies that are totally divorced  
                             
31 The data set of listed companies does not reflect the ownership composition of corporate sector, 
as most of state-owned companies and key foreign companies do not list their shares. So, the ratio 
of each ownership component itself is not significant. The argument here serves only to look at the 
changes before and after the corporate restructuring. 
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from the four causes of collapse described above, that is, with less dependence on 
borrowings from either domestic or external sources and with the less degree of 
diversification into various sectors including banking. The good example is Gudang 
Garam Group, the largest clove tobacco maker. 
 Another category is for companies that overcame the difficulties relying on 
their own managerial capabilities, such as Astra Group. Other than Salim Group that 
went down mainly because of political factors despite its solid management resources, 
the economic crisis put most business groups to the testing of their managerial 
capabilities as business entities. The boom period of the 1990s provided the favorable 
climate for corporate management, for instance, expanded opportunities to raise funds 
from the domestic and international financial markets, expanded chances to diversify 
business lines, growing affiliations of banks and business groups that made fund 
management easier, and expanded opportunities to acquire business concessions 
through privatization projects and deepening import substitution. In such a “too 
Table 8    Change of Ownership Composition of Listed Companies in Indonesia, 1996 and 1999
 
Ownership No. of Annual sales Net profits Assets No.of employees
classification   companies
 (unit) (billion Rp.) (billion Rp.) (trillion Rp.) (persons)
1996 1999 1996 1999 1996 1999 1996 1999 1996 1999
Domestic private company 184 221 92,958 169,391 8,869 3,336 283 405 578,640 689,480
Foreign company 33 46 12,560 37,659 1,016 -5,157 19 63 60,061 417,148
State-owned company 6 12 13,002 38,412 2,752 -23,092 62 242 53,396 123,758
  
Total 223 279 118,520 245,461 12,637 -24,913 364 710 692,097 1,230,386
 
Composition (%)
Domestic private company 82.5 79.5 78.4 68.8 70.2 -14.8 77.8 56.0 83.6 55.7
Foreign company 14.8 16.4 10.6 15.4 8.0 20.9 5.2 9.1 8.7 34.1
State-owned company 2.7 4.1 11.0 15.8 21.8 93.8 16.9 35.0 7.7 10.1
 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Calculated from ECFIN, Indonesian Capital Market Directory , 1999 and 2000, Jakarta.
Note:  Classification between domestic private companies and foreign companies depends on whether the largest shareholde
          is a domestic or foreign investor as of the year studied, not coinciding with the company's legal status based on
          the investment law, that is, domestic investment company (PMDN) or foreign investment company (PMA).
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favorable” environment, regardless of ethnic Chinese or pribumi capital, local big 
businesses weakened their managerial capabilities, or even without managerial 
capabilities they were able to grow, but now those businesses are being weeded out on 
a large scale. In that sense, the major capital realignment through the restructuring 
policies of the banking and corporate sectors goes beyond the dismantling of the 
alliance between the political power and big businesses and also means the selection of 
businesses on the basis of corporate managerial capabilities. 
 
4. Key Policy Issues on Economic Ownership 
 
In the five years of the post-Soeharto period, Indonesia’s economic ownership structure 
has gone into a change characterized by a decline of big private capital and its 
replacement with state and foreign capital. This phenomenon is considered to have 
arisen from the conflux of two processes, the implementation of the IMF-
recommended reform policy and changes in the economic structure induced by the 
political regime change. The government agency IBRA is implementing bank and 
corporate restructuring policy, trying to meet the impact of both processes. 
 IBRA is at once a political agency, for its policy-making processes are 
intervened in by a number of actors struggling to get their own interests reflected to 
IBRA decisions. In this sense, IBRA policies are a political product. Policies drafted by 
IBRA and the Minister in charge32 must be approved by the Financial Sector Policy 
Committee (FSPC, or Komite Kebijakan Sektor Keuangan, KKSK), President, the 
IBRA-monitoring institutions, the House of Representatives and political parties, and 
finally IMF’s approval. The post-Soeharto policy making process is far more complex 
than at anytime in the past. 
                             
32 The jurisdiction of IBRA was transferred from the Minister of Finance to the State Minister for 
state-owned enterprises in the Megawati government starting from August 2001. The State Minister 
now in charge is Laksamana Sukardi, one of the leading members of the party in power, Indonesian 
Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) led by Megawati herself. 
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 The first key issue in economic ownership restructuring led by IBRA is 
utilization of foreign capital; to what extent Soeharto-time big private capital, once 
transferred to state control, should be sold off to foreign hands. The actors affecting 
IBRA policy making are generally divided over this issue into a pro-foreign capital 
faction and a nationalist faction. The former argues that banking and corporate sectors 
should be strengthened by introducing competent foreign capital equipped with 
managerial capabilities and expertise. The latter stands against the former’s idea that 
would increase Indonesia’s dependence on foreign capital in the key industries. But 
both seems agreed on the point that reformasi in the economic sphere should be carried 
forward by wiping away the previous structure of vested interests held by the Soeharto 
family and Soeharto-linked capitalists. 
 The opposite choice to foreign capital is pribumi capital. Pribumi capital in 
turn is divided into two segments --- state capital and private pribumi capital. The 
choices here are whether the former big private capital now under IBRA should be kept 
controlled by state or sold off to private pribumi asset management companies. It is 
interesting to note that this state-or-pribumi alternative itself was constituted during the 
Soekarno era. Whichever the choice, this framing of alternatives reflects chauvinistic 
economic nationalism bearing the birthmark of Indonesian economy. Conversely, if 
policy decisions are to be made to utilize foreign capital on a large scale as the 
spearhead of the bank and corporate restructuring efforts, Indonesia then would be 
doing something unprecedented in its history. 
 Located in between the two extremes is the formula of reutilization of ethnic 
Chinese capital, the main body of capital accumulation in the Soeharto era. How far 
ethnic Chinese big capital is reutilized is the second key policy issue. A realistic choice 
may be to let emerge a mix of ethnic Chinese, foreign, and private pribumi capitals, 
inviting the participation of those ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs which have not been 
too seriously hit by the political change and economic crisis and so have surplus to 
invest. Also those ethnic Chinese business groups that have overcome their plights 
through their own managerial capabilities can be effectively utilized as the main source 
of Indonesian industrial competitiveness. This last will certainly be a crucial element in 
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the Indonesian economy’s new growth scenario. 
 The economic environment surrounding Indonesia is far more competitive 
than in the Soeharto period. Regional economic integration has progressed, corporate 
activities are globalizing, and the economic power of China is rising remarkably. From 
the point of view of industrial competitiveness, one recommendable scenario of 
Indonesian economic ownership reform would be to invite foreign companies with 
high expertise and competitiveness as much as possible, to activate around them ethnic 
Chinese business groups that have overcome the crisis as well as private pribumi 
capital including medium and small enterprises, and to promote their collective 
activities through mutual linkages. The state support for banks and corporations should 
be a temporary measure. In adopting new ownership intervention policies, the 
Indonesian government faces a crucial ordeal where its capability for public 
governance is tested. Whether the Indonesian government can control influences of 
short-term political interests and economic nationalism, whether it can make policy 
judgment on the basis of economic rationality, and whether it can opt for policies with 
corporate capabilities as the criterion so as to acquire competitiveness and productivity 
in long-term perspectives are of critical importance. 
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